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Pre[illegible] All,
but especially the LEARNED.

By JOSEPH [illegible]ONHOME,
R[illegible] of [illegible] in the County of
Cornwall; And Chaplain in Ordinary
to His MAJESTY.

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GUIL. JANE.

14 Aug. 1677.

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TO THE

Right Reverend Father in God,

HENRY,

By the Providence of God, Lord Bishop of

LONDON.

My Lord,

THese Arguments and Reasons were the Shield wherewith Derodon Publick Professor in Philosophy, in the Academy of Aurange withstood the Assaults of Atheists, which swarmed in several places of Europe, about the time that this Land was full of them; which they themselves made plain and evident to all the World, when by an Example, without example, they made a mock at Laws, Justice, Religion, and God himself, by Embruing their prophane hands in the never enough lamented blood of the true Protector of Laws, Justice and Subjects, the Pattern of Religion and Piety, and Gods true and lawful Vicegerent in these Three great Kingdoms. He delivered first in his School Disputations, the Objections of Atheists, and furnished his Auditory with Mediums wherewith they might in a Syllogistical way Encounter these

Monſters; *and afterwards Imparted them to his* Countrey *in his own* Tongue: *In the which, being fallen into my hands, I looked upon them as a* Jewel, *which I have ſince kept cloſe by me, both beyond Sea, and here at home. And now ſeeing we live in an* Age *wherein we may very well take up the Prophets complaint*, The wicked walk on every ſide, *Pſ.* 12. *v.* 8. *and ſay of moſt men in this our* Britiſh Iſrael, *what the Apoſtle of the* Gentiles *ſaid concerning the* Cretians, *That they are* unruly, vain Talkers, and Deceivers, who ſubvert whole houſes, (*and if they could* whole Kingdoms) teaching things which they ought not; and that they profeſs to know God, but in works deny him; being abominable and diſobedient, and unto every good work reprobate, *Titus* 1. *v.* 10, 11, 16. *I have thought it my* Duty *to frame theſe* Arguments *in a* known Tongue, *to the People of this Land, that firſt both they and my ſelf, may uſe them againſt this* wicked brood, *as* Phinehas *did his javelin againſt the wicked and prophane* Zimri, *and impudent and brazen-faced* Cozbi, *Numbers* 25. *v.* 7, 14. *And ſecondly, that both all debauched and ignorant perſons, if they will take the pains to read over this ſmall* Tract, *being convinced by the* truth *and* ſolidity *of theſe* Reaſons, *the one, that there is a* glorious God, *before whoſe* Judgment-Seat *they muſt (one day) all appear, and in whoſe hands* it is a fearful thing to fall, *they may receive* Inſtruction rather than Silver, and Knowledge rather than choice Gold, *Prov.* 8. *v.* 10. *and ſo grow in* grace and in the knowledge of God and our Lord Jeſus Chriſt. *And the other, that they may no more look upon the* Heavens

Heavens *and the* Elements, *as bodies of eternal duration and continuance; nor live in this present world as if there were no death to cut off the thr of their sensual* Lives; *no* Graves *wherein the* pampered Carcasses *must be turned into* dust *a* ashes, *and become the* meat of worms; *nor* Judgment-day, *wherein they must all stand befor the* Throne *of that God,* who is a consuming fir *Hebr.* 12. *v.*20. *but have grace, whereby they ma* serve God acceptably with reverence and god ly fear: *and like the* Thessalonians, *from their* I dols they may be turned to God, *and from their* Errors *and* wilful blindness, *to* serve and adore the true and living God, 1 *Thess.* 1. *v.*9,10.

If these two sorts of men, *who dote and rely too much upon* Nature, *may be convinced of their* Errours, ignorance *and* lewd life, *by casting their eyes upon, and seriously considering the weight of these* Natural Reasons: *like* Galen, *who was wrought upon by an Anatomical Observation, I have attained half the end I intended in this Work: But if these* Arguments, *with the* blessing of him whose Being they demonstrate, *may dis-thronize out of the hearts of others (I mean the refined and professed* Atheists) *that* grand Impiety *of theirs; so that (whether publickly or privately) they may fall down before the* Throne of God, *and* trembling *and* astonished, *cry out with* Saul, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do, *Acts* 9. 4, 6. *Then shall I have reaped the fruit I expect of this* Labour.

My Lord, *I hope this small* Tract *will be useful to all sorts of persons, but especially to the* young

Saints, *in the two famous* Nurseries *of this* Kingdom, OXFORD *and* CAMBRIDGE, *who are every day fitting themselves for the* Work of the Sanctuary. *For if they will seriously consider the necessary* Conclusions *of these* Arguments, *they shall clearly see the* invisible things of God, even his eternal Power and Godhead, *and understand them from the* Creation of the world, *Rom.* 1,20. *and so be brought* to remember their Creator in the days of their youth, *Eccl.* 12. 1. *and withal shall be furnished with such weapons as will conquer both* Scepticisme, *sometimes too too much entertained in the* Schools; *and the foulest of all Impieties* Atheism: *which though not taught and defended openly, yet by a subtle pretended way of arguing,* Cognitionis causa, *and sometimes by a cunning railing at the* holiest things, *is unhappily instilled in the hearts of young people.*

My Lord, *I will not excuse my self for the undertaking of this* small Work, *for I have learned this true* Position, *among other* Axiomes *in the* Universities, *both here and beyond Sea,* Non nobis solum nati sumus, *We are not born for our selves alone, but our Countrey challengeth an Interest in* us, *our* Friends *and our* Posterity, *do lay claim to us: Yet such wicked days are come upon us, though a man for* glory to God, love to his Posterity, good will to his Countrey, *or other* honest motives, *makes private things publick, for the* common good *of the* Church *and* State, *he is seldom* praised *of any, but* reproved *of many, and* condemned *or* censured *of all malicious persons.* Bonum quo communius, eo melius, *hath been*

and

and will be a true Moral Principle, *though ſome ſcorn to put it in execution: We know the beſt* Maſter *that ever man ſerved did reprove and condemn him for an* evil *and* ungracious *Servant, that* hid his Talent in a Napkin, *refuſing to put it forth to his* Maſters uſe and advantage.

My Lord, *I humbly beg your* Lordſhips pardon *for aſſuming perhaps more liberty than is fit, in preſenting this ſhort* Treatiſe *to your* view, *and to your Lordſhips* patronage, *yet truſting upon your Lordſhips* goodneſs *for a* liberal acceptance. Nature *and your* Noble Birth, *hath taught you, that to be* generous *is to be* vertuous: *but ſure it is, that* Wiſdom, Learning *and* Piety *have perfected* Natural Diſpoſition *in you; ſo that I may ſay, the ſlenderer the* Preſent, *and the meaner the* Giver *is, the more will it commend the* favourable Acceptance, *and the* noble Receiver. *To ſuch* Eminent perſons *as your Lordſhip is, both by* Birth, Dignity, *and* Vertue, *men do not ſo much give the* Thing *it ſelf which they* preſent, *as in it make tender of their* hearts, love, duty *and* deareſt regards. *All which I here humbly preſent to your* ſhips goodneſs, *Commending you to the* goodneſs *of Him that ſo highly hath* honoured you, *and beſeeeching Him to heap up more and more all his* Bleſſings *upon your* Perſon, Place *and* Relations, *to the* glory of his Name, *the* good of our Church, *and the* encouragement of Learning and Piety; *the* Joy *and* Comfort *of your heart in this life: which I earneſtly pray may be*

long and happy, and to the Eternal peace *and* joy *of your* Soul, *in the day of the great Shepherd and Bishop of our Souls.*

Thus prays

Your Lordships

Most humble,

Most obedient,

&

Most obliged Servant,

Joshua Bonhome.

TO

TO THE
Chriſtian READER.

BEfore I proceed to the main Matter of this Treatiſe, I hold it neceſſary to diſabuſe ſome Pious and Religious Perſons, who having never met nor medled with the prophane and ungodly Men (confuted and convinced in this Book) do verily think and imagine that there is never a Man ſo deſperately Wicked, as to deny and diſ-affirm a God-head. In order to that, let theſe godly Perſons know, that there are in the World three ſorts of Athieſts; *viz.* 1. The ſubtle and wilely, 2. The lewd and debauched; and 3. The ignorant.

The firſt of theſe, are they who having gotten a way of diſcourſing cunningly, with the help of their empty knowledge of natural Philoſophy, do undertake to frame Arguments againſt the God-head, endeavour to anſwer the Reaſons which prove its Exiſtency and Being; and converſing with good and honeſt men, convey ſubtilly into their minds, the Vennom themſelves were infected and corrupted withal. I have ſpoken with one that had written a Dialogue againſt all Religions, who objected to me the firſt and ſixth Reaſon or Anſwer, confuted in this Book, but ſoon after he grew Frantick, and dyed in a ſad and lamentable condition.

I met once with another, who urged very fiercely the ſecond Reaſon they uſe to juſtifie their Impiety (which reaſon is propounded and fully anſwered in this Treatiſe) and diſdainfully ſcoffed at my reply; this alſo a while after fought a *Duel*, and died upon the place.

I have diſputed againſt another, who made uſe of the firſt and fifth Arguments of theirs (in this Tract propounded and overthrown:) This on a day of fearful Thunder and Lightnings, made it his Bravado to ſpeak Execrable Blaſphemies againſt the Divinity; but in a ſhort time he died (fearfully mad) with the Plague.

I have ſeen ſeveral others that would Alledge all the pretended Reaſons, which in this Book will appear to be full of Abſurdities, and they for the moſt part have died very ſtrangely, and the reſt have ſuffered violent Death.

It will not be amiſs to Aſſociate with theſe Monſters, a certain other dangerous ſort of Men; who proteſt themſelves to be Scepticks, and hold it lawful to doubt of all things, that they may alſo ſpeak dubiouſly of the Divinity; againſt ſuch Men, it were well if an Inquiſition of *Spain* were ſet up all the World over.

The Lewd and Debauched Atheiſts, are for the moſt part young Men of great and Rich Families, who having had a bad Education, are eaſily drawn away, both by the frequenting and keeping company with the ſubtle and cunning Atheiſts; and by giving place to all the Charms of Sport, and Play, Drunkenneſs and Women: do inſenſibly abandon themſelves to the moſt abominable Vices that Hell and the Devil can Deviſe.

wiſe. Theſe are in greater number than theſe-fined Athieſts (as ſome call them) ſeeing they ſwarm in great number in the Courts of moſt Princes, and the greateſt Cities in *Europe*.

The ignorant Athieſts, which exceed in number the two former ſorts, are they who profeſſing indeed that there is a God; have notwithſtanding but a light Opinion of the ſame; grounded only either upon the Hear-ſay of their Parents, or the General Conſent of them that are daily converſant withal: Neither are they perſwaded of this truth by the Creation of the World, nor by the admirable and wonderful Diſpoſition and Symmetry of the parts of it; nor by any of the Reaſons and Arguments which are to be ſeen in this Book. Theſe are of the vulgar and common ſort of People, who being loath to give themſelves the trouble to be inſtructed in the wayes of Salvation, never believe that there is a God, but becauſe they are born and bred among thoſe that believe it. Such are they alſo, who being drawn away of their own Luſts, and Entiſed, fall into grievous and horrible ſins, without the leaſt ſorrow, or reluctancy. For I cannot be perſwaded, that a man who believes that there is a God Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth, and who is within him, without him, and about him, and every where; and who can caſt him for ever into the bottomleſs Pit of Hell for his ſins: I cannot be perſwaded, I ſay, that ſuch a man will ſin willingly and wittingly, againſt a God ſo great, and ſo puiſſant, without horrour and reſiſtance.

For if the preſence of a King, a Lord, or a Judge,

Judge, will keep back the moſt wicked from Committing their Villanies; much more, if one were perſwaded there is a God Almighty, King of Kings, Lord of Lords, and Judge of all the Earth; his preſence would keep Man back from Committing Adulterses, Robberies, Murthers, Buggeries, and all other abominable Crimes, which are ſo frequent in the World.

Therefore let the Devout and Religious Perſons, who think well of all Men, never find fault with me; if my zeal to the glory of God hath cauſed me to preſent the World with the Arguments here contained againſt this prophane and ungodly Brood the Athieſts. And I heartily wiſh that all young People may ſo Arme and Fortifie themſelves with theſe my Reaſons, that they may keep themſelves from being ſeduced by ſuch Devils.

A TABLE of the Principal Matters contained in this BOOK.

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1. THat the World not being from all Eternity, one must necessarily conclude there is a God that Created it. 2. That the Sun hath not been from all Eternity. 3. That the Earth hath not been from all Eternity. 4. That the Day hath not been from all Eternity. 5. That neither Day nor Night have been from all Eternity. 6. That the Moon hath not been from all Eternity. 7. That the Sea hath not been from all Eternity. 8. That Men have not been from all Eternity. 9. The First Confirmation. 10. The Second Confirmation. 11. The Third Confirmation. 12. That Alteration, Generation, and Corruption, are not from all Eternity. 13. That neither Movable Things, nor Time, have been from all Eternity. 14. A General Proof that the Bodies have not been from all Eternity, nor (consequently) the World.

CHAP. II.

1 THE first Answer of Athiests, that Successive Things may have been from all Eternity, collectively & not distributively. 2. How many ways

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a Thing may be related to, or agree with, another Distributively, or Collectively. 3. *That Successive Things cannot be from all Eternity Collectively.* 4. *That Old Men, Young Men, and Children, Collectively, or taken together, cannot have been from all Eternity.* 5. *That the Dead have not been from all Eternity.* 6. *That all men Collectively, having been begotten, cannot have been from all Eternity.*

That the right understanding and apprehension of the destinction of Athiests, is a sufficient refutation of the same.

CHAP. III.

1. *THE second Answer of Athiests, viz. That as in the After-Eternity, that is to say, in the Future, there will be no last or furthermost; so in the Fore-Eternity, that is is to say, in time past, there hath been no first or foremost.* 2. *That Athiests compare unlike things, and the disparity explained.* 3. *That re-ascending towards the time past, one may run through it; and so 'tis not Infinite.* 4. *That the Succession of things cannot be Eternal, and why.*

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Infinite, is greater than another, Materially, and not Formally. 6. *That it is a Contradiction to grant or make one Infinite to be greater than the other.* 7. *That the Answer of Atheists doth not at all hurt or touch our choice and indissoluble Reason, drawn from the distance of Men.* 8. *What the space is not, and what it is proved.* 9. *The Answer to the Atheists First Argument, drawn from the infiniteness of the Oriental and Occidental space.* 10. *Another Answer to their Second Argument, drawn from the infiniteness of the thoughts both of Men and Angels.* 11. *Another to their third Argument, drawn from the pretended infiniteness of Men and Lyons possible, that is to say, that God may produce and create.*

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CHAP. VI.

1. THE *Fifth Answer of Athiests, saying, That there hath been, from all Eternity, Matter without Form.* 2. *The Proof, That there hath not*

but been from all Eternity a Matter without Forms; and that the Matter could not produce the Forms. 3. That the Eternal Atomes, by a casual concourse, have not made and disposed the World. 4. That the Forms cannot have been produced, but by God.

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CHAP. VIII.

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CHAP. IX.

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THE

CHAP. I.

1. That the World not being from all Eternity, one muſt neceſſarily conclude there is a God that Created it. 2. That the Sun hath not been from all Eternity. 3. That the Earth hath not been from all Eternity. 4. That the day hath not been from all Eternity. 5. That neither Day nor Night have been from all Eternity. 6. That the Moon hath not been from all Eternity. 7. That the Sea hath not been from all Eternity. 8. That Men have not been from all Eternity. 9. The firſt Confirmation. 10. The ſecond Confirmation. 11. The third Confirmation. 12. That Alteration, Generation, and Corruption, are not from all Eternity. 13. That neither moveable Things, nor Time, have been from all Eternity. 14. A general proof that the Bodies have not been from all Eternity, nor (conſequently) the World.

THE Knowledge of Cauſes by their Effects, is the beſt and moſt certain part of Philoſophy. Fire is known by Burning, Water by its Moiſtening and Cooling quality; Men are known by Reaſoning and Diſcourſing,

Lions by their Roaring; and all other Things by their Operations. Now if ſecond Cauſes, which for the moſt part may be apprehended by humane ſenſe, cannot be better known than by their Effects; much more the firſt Cauſe dwelling in an inacceſſible Light, is to be known by his Works. The Holy Apoſtle of Chriſt, St. *Paul*, teaches this very clearly in his Epiſtle to the *Roman*, *Chap.* 1. *v.* 20. when he ſays, *That the inviſible Things of God, even his Eternal Power and God-head, are clearly ſeen, being underſtood by the things that are made.* Shewing thereby, that Naturally, by the Contemplation of the Creatures, a man may attain to the Knowledge of the Creator; and by the conſideration of the glory of this beautiful Univerſe, may be led and induced to the admiration of its Creator. Following the ſteps of this Holy Doctor, I will demonſtrate by the Creation of the World the Exiſtence of the God-head, againſt thoſe whom Debauchery, ill Company, and want of Learning, hath ſo horribly corrrupted, that they dare publickly deny him, in whom even they move and live, and have their being. I reaſon thus:

1. If the World hath not been from all Eternity, it follows it hath had a beginning; and having not had that beginning

ning of it ſelf; ſeeing nothing can produce it ſelf, it muſt needs be granted neceſſarily that another hath given it that beginning, and conſequently hath created it. But the Creator of the Univerſe and God, are one and the ſame thing. That the World hath not been from all Eternity, will apppear, in running through the chiefeſt parts of the ſame. I will begin with the Sun, the moſt glorious of all Soul-leſs Creatures, and which Aſtronomers hold to be one hundred and ſixty times bigger than the whole Earth.

2. The Sun was never without Lighting the Earth, as the Atheiſts themſelves grant, who ſay that the World hath been from all Eternity in the ſame being and caſe it is now; but the Sun hath not Lightened the Earth from all Eternity; therefore the Sun hath not been from all Eternity. The Aſſumption or ſecond Propoſition is demonſtrated thus: If the Sun hath Enlightened the Earth from all Eternity, either it hath Enlightened from all Eternity our Hemiſphere onely; or that of our Antipodes onely, or both, Now the Sun hath not Enlightned from all Eternity our Hemiſphere only, nor that of our Antipodes only, nor both, which is proved thus: If the Sun from all Eternity hath Lightened our Hemi-

ſphere onely, it follows that the Hemiſphere of our Antipodes hath not been Lightened by the Sun from all Eternity, though there have been wanting but very few hours; ſeeing the Sun having Lightened our Hemiſphere, goes and Enlightens that of our Antipodes ſome few hours after: juſt ſo, If the Sun hath Enlightened from all Eternity the Hemiſphere of our Antipodes onely, it follows that our Hemiſphere hath not been Lightened by the Sun from all Eternity, though notwithſtanding there have been wanting but a very few hours; ſeeing the Sun having Lightened the Hemiſphere of our Antipodes, comes and Enlightens ours ſome few hours after.

Now was there ever a man ſo void of reaſon and underſtanding, to believe, that betwixt that which is from all Eternity, and that which is not from all Eternity, the difference is onely of few hours; and that there is but half a days diſtance betwixt that which is finite, and that which is infinite, Time and Eternity? Finally, If both the Hemiſpheres have been Enlightened by the Sun from all Eternity, either it was all at once, or one after another; not all at once, elſe it would have been Day every where at once, and the Sun would have been in two places

at

at the ſame time, which is impoſſible: nor one after another, becauſe that which hath been Lightened from all Eternity, cannot have been Lightened after another, nothing having been before that which is from all Eternity. But Atheiſts do hold that our Hemiſphere hath been Enlightened from all Eternity; then our Hemiſphere hath not been Lightened after another: and ſo conſequently not after that of our Antipodes. They hold alſo that the Hemiſphere of our Antipodes hath been Lightened from all Eternity, then it hath not been Enlightened after another, and conſequently not after our Hemiſphere; from whence one may infallibly conclude that both the Hemiſpheres have not been Lightened from all Eternity one after another. Finally, Two Eternal Things cannot be but together, and conſequently one cannot be after another; there being nothing before that which is Eternal. Therefore if the two Illuminations, to wit, that of ours and that of our Antipodes Hemiſphere, have been Eternal, they neceſſarily muſt have been together, and not one after another; which is impoſſible, as above I have proved. I conclude then that the Sun, not having Enlightened our Hemiſphere from all Eternity onely, nor

that of our Antipodes onely, nor both, either at once, or one after another; that the Sun (I ſay) hath by no means Enlightened the Earth from all Eternity; And ſeeing that the Sun (as Atheiſts themſelves ſay) never was without Lightening the Earth, it follows that Illumination not being from all Eternity, the Sun alſo is not from all Eternity, but hath had a beginning; and having not that beginning of it ſelf, ſeeing nothing is the cauſe of it ſelf, it follows, that another hath given it a beginning, and conſequently hath created it: Now the Creator of the Sun, and God are the ſame. As to that as is objected by Atheiſts, concerning the Eternal Collection of all Illuminations, or their Eternal Succeſſion, ſhall be fully confuted hereafter in our Replies to their Anſwers.

3. The ſame reaſon that proves that the Sun hath not been from all Eternity, proves alſo that the Earth hath not been from all Eternity, thus: The Earth (as Atheiſts ſay) never was without being Enlightened by the Sun; now I have ſhewed already that the Earth hath not been Enlightened by the Sun from all Eternity, therefore it hath not been from all Eternity. If you obſerve the laſt Parentheſis, you will ſee that this Argu-

ment

ment is formed from the Atheiſts own Doctrine; for ſhould I reaſon according to Holy Scripture, which is infallible, the very firſt verſe of *Geneſis* would prove to them that the Earth was Created before the Sun, and conſequently was not always Enlightened by the Sun.

4. The ſame reaſon may alſo be confirmed thus, Either there hath been ſome Day from all Eternity or not; if not, it follows that all Days have had a beginning, and therefore that the Day hath not been from all Eternity. If the Day hath not been from all Eternity, neither the Sun hath been from all Eternity, ſeeing the Sun never was without Light and Day. If there hath been ſome Day from all Eternity, either there hath been one onely or many; if one onely, it will follow that all other Days have had a beginning, and that there wants but one Day to the Eternity of the ſecond Day, which is moſt abſurd: Seeing betwixt that which is finite and that which is infinite; betwixt Time and Eternity; betwixt that which hath had a Beginning, and that which never had a Beginning, there is more than a Days diſtance. If there have been many Days from all Eternity, either it were all at once, which is repugnant to the common ſenſe; ſeeing

Days ſucceed one the other, or one after another, which is repugnant to Eternity; for that which is from all Eternity and without Beginning, is not after another; as I have proved already.

5. This Reaſon may be confirmed again, thus: When two Men have been at ſome place, ſuppoſe a Town or City, they muſt needs have been there, either at the ſame time, or one after another; ſo, ſeeing that Day and Night have been in our Hemiſphere, they muſt needs have been in it, either at the ſame time, and at once, or one after another, not at the ſame time and at once; elſe it would have been Day and Night in the ſame place at once, which is impoſſible; not alſo one after another, for it would have been the Day after the Night, or the Night after the Day: If the Day hath been after the Night, it follows that it hath not been from all Eternity, ſeeing that which is Eternal is not after another; and moreover, there will have been very little wanting to the Eternity of the Day; ſeeing the Day is few hours after Night, which is ſaid to be Eternal by Atheiſts: If the Night hath been after the Day, it follows that it hath not been from all Eternity (that is in our Hemiſphere) ſeeing that which is Eternal, is

not

not after another; and moreover there will have been very little wanting to the Eternity of the Night, ſeeing the Night is few hours after the Day, which is ſaid to be Eternal by Atheiſts: Therefore I conclude that the Day hath not been from all Eternity, nor conſequently the Sun, which never was without the Day. Finally, Two Eternal Things cannot be but together, and conſequently one cannot be after another; there being nothing before that which is Eternal: But the Day and the Night cannot be together, therefore the Day and the Night are not Eternal Things.

6. By the like reaſon one may prove that the Moon hath not been from all Eternity, thus: If the Moon hath been from all Eternity, either it hath been from all Eternity, onely Full, or onely New, or both. If it hath been from all Eternity onely Full, it follows it hath not been New from all Eternity, though notwithſtanding there have been but few days wanting; ſeeing the New Moon is few days after the Full Moon. And ſo if the Moon hath been from all Eternity onely New, it follows it hath not been Full from all Eternity, though notwithſtanding there have been but few days wanting; ſeeing that the Full Moon is

few

few days after the New Moon. And if it hath been both New and Full from all Eternity, it were either at once, which is repugnant to common ſenſe and experience, or one after another, which is oppoſite to Eternity; for that which is Eternal, cannot be after another; as above I ſaid: Therefore the Moon having never been without being either Full or New, or wanting but very little, and having been neither Full nor New from all Eternity, it is evident it hath not been from all Eternity; for two Eternal Things cannot be but together, as above I have proved. Now the Full Moon and the New Moon cannot be together; therefore the Full Moon nor the New Moon can be Eternal.

7. The ſame way of arguing may be uſed againſt the Eternity of the Sea, If the Sea hath been from all Eternity, either it hath been from all Eternity with the Flowing onely, or with the Ebbing onely, or with both: If it hath been from all Eternity with the Flowing onely, it follows that it hath not been from all Eternity with the Ebbing, though there have been but very few hours wanting; ſeeing the Ebbing of the Sea is ſix hours or well near, after it hath began Flowing: So if it hath been from all Eternity with

with the Ebbing onely, it follows it hath not been from all Eternity with the Flowing, though there have been but very few hours wanting; ſeeing the Sea hath its Flowing ſix hours or thereabouts, after the beginning of its Ebbing. And if it hath been from all Eternity with its Flowing and Ebbing, it muſt be all at once, which is impoſſible; ſeeing it cannot go backwards and forwards, Flow and Ebbe at the ſame time, or one after another, which is oppoſite to Eternity: for as I have ſaid above, two things Eternal cannot be but together, and conſequently cannot be one after another; there being nothing before that which is Eternal. But the Flowing and Ebbing cannot be together, therefore not Eternal. And ſo ſeeing the Sea never was without Flowing or Ebbing, and that neither the Flowing nor Ebbing have been from all Eternity, it is evident that the Sea is not from all Eternity. As for the Eternal Collection of all Flowings and Ebbings, or the Eternal Succeſſion of the ſame, it will be confuted hereafter.

8. Now let us come to the Conſideration of other Creatures, and let us ſhew that Men have not been from all Eternity, and that they never ſucceeded one another

ther by an Eternal Generation; my reaſon is this: If Men had been from all Eternity, and had been one after another by an Eternal Succeſſion of Generations, it would follow that the number of thoſe Men which have been in time paſt till now, ſhould be infinite; for it is evident that if the number of them were finite and determined in it ſelf, there would have have been ſome firſt and ſome ſecond, &c. and at this day ſome laſt; and where ſome may be ſaid to be firſt, there is a beginning, and conſequently no Eternity; but the number of Men which have been in time paſt till now, is not infinite; therefore Men have not been from all Eternity. The ſecond Propoſition is proved thus, An infinite number admits no greater number, but a greater number then that of Men which have been in times paſt till now can be given; ſeeing there have been more Hands, more Fingers, more Hairs, and more Beaſts than Men; therefore the number of Men which have been in times paſt till now, is not infinite. The firſt Propoſition of this laſt Syllogiſme, to wit, that an infinite number admits no greater number, is made good thus: If the infinite number could admit a greater number, or a greater number than the infinite could be given, it would follow

follow that an infinite number ſhould be exceeded by a greater number; ſeeing that of two numbers the greater exceeds the other: But the infinite number cannot be exceeded, ſeeing that which is exceeded is finite or termined, where it is exceeded; and the infinite cannot be finite; therefore the infinite number cannot admit a greater number.

9. Moreover, Either there hath been ſome Man from all Eternity or not; if not, it is evident that Men have not been from all Eternity; if any was from all Eternity, it follows that he ſhall not have been made or begotten by another; ſeeing that which is made or begotten of another, is after another: But that which is Eternal is not after another, there being nothing before that which is Eternal.

10. Again, Men which are ſaid (falſely) to have Lived from all Eternity, did not yet Live an Eternity, elſe they had Lived longer than a thouſand times one hundred millions of thouſands of years, which is againſt the common ſenſe; and therefore they have Lived but a finite time, that is an hundred or a thouſand years onely; from whence I reaſon thus: Betwixt that which is from all Eternity, and that which is not from all Eternity, there is a greater diſtance than of ſome few

few years; but betwixt the Life of Men, which are falſely ſaid to have Lived from all Eternity, and their Death, which is not from all Eternity, there is but a few years diſtance; therefore their Death, not being from all Eternity, it is impoſſible their Life ſhould have been from all Eternity.

11. Beſides, The Men which have Lived in time paſt till now, are diſtant one from another, with an infinite diſtance of time onely, or with a finite diſtance onely; or ſome are diſtant with a finite diſtance, and others with an infinite diſtance: If they are all diſtant with an infinite diſtance of time, it will follow, that betwixt Jeſus Chriſt as Man, and we that Live at preſent, there will be an infinite diſtance, and conſequently an infinite ſpace of time, which is falſe; ſeeing there is but one thouſand ſix hundred ſeventy ſeven years, according to the common ſupputation: It will follow alſo, that betwixt K. *Charles* the Firſt and K. *Charles* the Second, there will be an infinite diſtance of time; which is abſurd. If they are all diſtant with a finite diſtance of time onely, it follows that their duration contains a finite time onely, and conſequently are not Eternal, which is moſt true: If ſome are diſtant with a finite diſtance, and

others

others with an infinite diſtance ; and that of all them which are onely diſtant, with a finite diſtance, one takes the two remoteſt : For example, *Peter* who Liveth at this day, and then remounts towards them, that have preceded *Peter*, and from whom he is deſcended ; if one takes (I ſay) him who in a finite diſtance is the fartheſt, tow it, *John* ; I ſay that if one remounts a little higher, that is unto *William* the Father of *John*, it will follow that *Peter* and *William*, will be diſtant one from another, with an infinite diſtance of time ; ſeeing they are more diſtant and farther removed in a finite diſtance : ſo that it will follow, that betwixt the finite diſtance, which is between *Peter* and *John*, and the infinite diſtance between *Peter* and *William*, there will be but very few years difference, that is ſo many years (and no more) as are betwixt *William* the Father and *John* his Son ; which is altogether abſurd.

12. Add hereto, That every Generation preſuppoſeth ſome Alteration, that is ſome convenient Diſpoſition of the Matter, for the introduction of the Form, and Generation of the Compoſed: From whence I diſpute thus, That which is Eternal is not preceded, but Generation

on is preceded by Alteration, ſince it preſuppoſes it neceſſarily: therefore Generation is not Eternal; and conſequently Men have not ſucceeded one another by an Eternal Generation.

By the ſame reaſon one proves that Corruption is not Eternal, thus: That which is Eternal is not after another, ſeeing nothing is before, or precedes that which is Eternal; but Corruption is after Generation: Seeing one and the ſame thing cannot be at the ſame time begotten and corrupted, produced and deſtroyed; therefore Corruption is not Eternal. In one word, Eternal Things cannot be but together, and cannot be one after another; ſeeing nothing precedes, or is before that which is Eternal: But Alteration, Generation, and Corruption, cannot be together, but are neceſſarily one after another; that is, Corruption after Generation, and Generation after Alteration: Therefere Alteration, Generation and Corruption are not Eternal; and conſequently Men have not been begotten from all Eternity, nor have ſucceeded the one the others, by an Eternal Generation. Moreover, The Generation of the Thing, and the Thing begotten, cannot be but together: But the Thing begotten is not Eternal, ſeeing

it

it is after another; to wit, the begetting, at leaſt in the Generations of Men, of whom we ſpeak: Therefore Generation is not Eternal.

13. Another general reaſon may be added to what hath been ſaid hitherto, proving that all Moveable Things have had a Beginning, and that there is none which may have been from all Eternity; Thus, If Time is not Eternal, it follows that Motion is not Eternal, ſeeing that Time is nothing elſe but the duration of Motion; but Time is not Eternal, therefore Motion is not Eternal; nor conſequently the Sun, Moon, and Stars, which never were without Motion, that is without moving from Eaſt to Weſt; nor the Sea, which never was without Motion, that is, without Flowing or Ebbing; nor Men which never were without motion, that is without pulſe or reſpiration, nor without ſome Motion of the Vital or Animal Spirits. That Time hath not been Eternal, appears, becauſe Time Eternal is a Time infinite; Seeing the Time finite hath a beginning and an end, and the Eternal hath neither beginning nor end. Now Time hath not been infinite; Therefore it hath not been Eternal. That Time hath not been infinite, is clear, becauſe time infinite compriſes a number in-

finite of years; Seeing a finite number of years, cannot make an infinite time: but there is not an infinite number of years, therefore Time hath not been infinite. That there have not been an infinite number of years, is clear alſo; becauſe there cannot be a greater number, than an infinite number: elſe the infinite number ſhould be exceeded by this greater number: Seeing that of two numbers, the greateſt exceeds the other. And if an infinite number were exceeded, it would be finite and terminate, where it is exceeded, which is impoſſible; Seeing that to be infinite and finite are contradictories: But a greater number may be given than that of the Years which have been, ſeeing there have been more Moneths and Days than Years. Moreover the Year is always after the Moneth, the Moneth after the Day, the Day after the Hour, and the Hour after the Minute, and conſequently the Year, the Moneth, the Day, the Hour, in the whole, are not from all Eternity; ſeeing that which is Eternal is not after another. Moreover, We may ſay of Years, what we have ſaid of Men; *viz.* That the Years that have been in time paſt, either are all diſtant, with an infinite diſtance of time, or are all diſtant with a finite diſtance:

ſtance: If they are all diſtant with an infinite diſtance, it will follow that betwixt the Year One thouſand ſix hundred and ſeventy, and the Year One thouſand ſix hundred ſeventy ſeven, there is an infinite diſtance, and conſequently an infinite time, which is abſurd: If they are diſtant with a finite diſtance, it follows that they comprize but a finite time, and conſequently are not Eternal. Again, If ſome Years be diſtant with a finite diſtance, and others with an infinite diſtance, and that of all the Years which are only diſtant with a finite diſtance, one takes the two remoteſt: for example, This Year One thouſand ſix hundred ſeventy ſeven, marked A, and reaſcending with a finite diſtance to the remoteſt Year from the ſame, and that Year be marked B; I ſay that if one remounts a Year higher marked C; it will follow that the Years C and A, will be diſtant with an infinite diſtance, ſeeing they are more diſtant and remote than B and A; which are the remoteſt in a finite diſtance: ſo that it will follow that betwixt the finite diſtance B and A, and the infinite diſtance C and A, there will be but a years difference; and that the year C which is a finite time, added to the diſtance of B and A, which is alſo a finite time, will

be an infinite time; ſuch as is the diſtance of C and A, and that the time infinite, *viz.* the diſtance of C and A, by the detraction of a finite time, *viz.* the year C, will become finite; which is abſurd and contradictory.

Laſtly, All things pretended to be Eternal, as well permanent as ſucceſſive, either have been from all Eternity without action, or with action: If they have been from all Eternity without action, it will follow that the Sun hath been from all Eternity, without lighting, the Fire without burning, and Men without breathing, *&c.* which moſt part of Atheiſts themſelves deny, ſeeing they ſay, that the World hath been from all Eternity in the ſame caſe it is now. Beſides, all things pretended to be Eternal, either have been from all Eternity without action, during a finite time or during an infinite time. If they have been without action during a finite time only, it will follow that betwixt that thing which hath been from all Eternity, without action, and its action which is not from all Eternity; the difference will be only of a time limited and finite; and conſequently that betwixt that which is Eternal, *viz.* the thing without action, and that which is not Eternal, to wit, its

action

action, there will be but a finite time: and that to make its action Eternal, which is not Eternal, there will be wanting but a finite and determined time; and alſo that there will be but very little lacking, leſt that which is finite, *viz.* the time ſince the action of the thing, added to the finite, *viz.* the time the thing hath been without action, will make up an infinite time, ſuch as is the Eternity of a thing; which is abſurd and contradictory. If all things have remained without action during an infinite time, it will follow that the Sun, the Moon, and other Stars, have been longer than a hundred thouſand millions of thouſands of years, without moving and giving any light; Men and Beaſts have lived longer than a hundred thouſand millions of thouſands of years, without ſeeing, breathing, &c. which Atheiſts themſelves deny, when they affirm that the World hath been from all Eternity in the ſame caſe it is at preſent. Moreover, it is a Maxime received of all men, That *Idem quâ Idem, ſemper facit Idem.* For example, Fire that burns wood, coals, ſtraw, &c. will always burn, if it be conſtantly ſupplied with fuel. Therefore if the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have been without action

during an infinite time, from whence did it come to paſs, that they have acted afterwards? Certainly it cannot be of themſelves, no new thing being come to paſs, and having always remained in the ſame ſtate: and if it be of ſome other, it cannot be but of God. If all things have been from all Eternity with action; for example, the Sun with motion and illumination, Men with ratiocination, Oxen with bellowing, Lions with roaring, &c. they muſt needs neceſſarily have acted without ceaſing, during a finite, or an infinite time: If they have acted during a finite time only, it will follow that betwixt their action which is from all Eternity, and the ceſſation of their action, which is not from all Eternity, the difference will be of a finite and limited time only. And conſequently that betwixt that which is Eternal, and that which is not Eternal, betwixt that which is infinite, and that which is finite, the difference or diſtance will be of a finite and limited time, only; and that there will be wanting, but a certain finite time; leſt the ceſſation of their action, which is not Eternal, be Eternal; and that the finite time, to wit, the time ſince the ceſſation of their action, added to the finite time of the duration of the action, will make

up

up an infinite time, ſuch as is the Eternity of a thing; which is abſurd and contradictory. If they have acted without ceaſing during an infinite time, it will follow that a man hath ſpoken, an Oxe bellowed, a Lion roared, longer than a hundred thouſand millions of thouſands of years, which is ridiculous, and Atheiſts themſelves deny, when they affirm that the world hath been from all Eternity in the ſame caſe it is now. Beſides all this, The motion of the Sun, the word of Man, the roaring of a Lion, &c. have certain parts which cannot be Eternal; becauſe thoſe things that are Eternal cannot be but together, as hath been proved already: But the parts of the motion of the Sun cannot be together, becauſe they ſucceed one another; therefore they cannot be Eternal. Neither can the parts of the ſpeech of a Man be together; for when he pronounces one word, he doth not pronounce another; and when he utters a Syllable, he doth not utter another. For Example, If one ſuppoſes that a man from all Eternity hath pronounced this word (glory) it is evident that the Syllable (ry) was uttered after the Syllable (glo) and conſequently that the prolation of the Syllable (ry) is not Eternal, ſeeing that which is Eternal is not

after another, though there have been wanting but very little, to wit, as much time only, as one needs to utter the Syllable (glo) which is absurd and contradictory.

CHAP. II.

1. *Wherin one may see the first Answer of Atheists, saying, That Successive things may have been from all Eternity collectively, and not distributively.* 2. *How many ways one thing may be related to, or agree with another, distributively or collectively.* 3. *That Successive things cannot be from all Eternity collectively.* 4. *That old men, young men, and children collectively or taken together, cannot have been from all Eternity.* 5. *That the dead have not been from all Eternity.* 6. *That all men collectively having been begotten, cannot have been from all Eternity.* 7. *That the right understanding and apprehension of the distinction of Atheists, is a sufficient refutation of the same.*

1. THE first Answer of Atheists to all our former Arguments, is to be seen in *Oviedo* his Natural

ral Philoſophy, in the Nineteenth Controverſie, in the ſecond and third Propoſitions; where having ſaid, That Time, Motion, and all Succeſſive Things may have been from all Eternity; and having cited for his warranters, *Thomas Vaſquez*, and *Pererius*, and ſeveral others, at laſt he Anſwers our Arguments and Reaſons thus: All Generations and Corruptions (ſaith he) all Days and all Nights, all the Flowings and Ebbings of the Sea, all the Full Moons and the New Moons, all Men and all Beaſts, *&c.* if they be taken and conſidered particularly, have had a beginning, and none of theſe things in particular is from all Eternity.

But all Generations taken together, or the Collection of all the Generations that have been in time paſt, all Days taken together, or the Collection of all the Days that have been in time paſt, all Men taken together, or the Collection of all the Men that have been in time paſt, *&c.* all theſe Collections (ſaith he) may have been from all Eternity.

The Reply.

2. Againſt this Anſwer, I ſay, That one thing may be related to, and affirmed of

of another, four ways chiefly: First, When it agrees with, or belongs to all together, and to every one in particular: in this manner one may ſay that all men are rational; becauſe all Men taken together are ſo, and every man taken in particular is rational. Secondly, One thing may be related to and affirmed of another, when it agrees with, or belongs to every one in particular; and not to all together: and in this manner one may ſay that all men do occupy a certain place, and are not in ſeveral places at once; becauſe every man in particular is in a certain determined place, and cannot be in divers places at once; but all men taken together are in divers places at once, *viz.* In *England*, *France*, *Spain*, *Italy*, &c. Thirdly, One thing is related to, or affirmed of another, when it agrees with it becauſe of ſome one, but yet not with every one in particular. In this manner one may ſay that the Kings of *France* are from the year Four hundred and twenty, or thereabouts; becauſe *Pharamond*, who is thought to have been the firſt King of *France*, began to reign about that time; but every King of *France* is not from the year Four hundred and twenty: Likewiſe, One may ſay that the

the Romans did ſometime Conquer the Gauls, becauſe *Julius Cæſar* a Roman, with the help of ſome Roman Legions did ſubdue the ſame; but every Roman Souldier did not do that Exploit or Atchievement. Fourthly, One thing agrees with, or is related to another, when it belongs to all taken together; but neither to ſome one, nor to every one in particular. Thus one may ſay that the Kings of *France* have reigned above Twelve hundred years; which is onely to be affirmed of all the Kings of *France* taken together in their ſucceſſion, but not of ſome one King, nor of every King of *France* in particular. So it may be ſaid that the Apoſtles have preached the Goſpel throughout the whole World, which muſt be ſaid of all the Apoſtles taken together, yet diſperſed, ſeeing every Apoſtle did not Preach the Goſpel in every part of the World.

3. This being granted (as it muſt needs be) let us ſee which of theſe four ways, Atheiſts may underſtand the Propoſition in queſtion, *viz.* That Generations and Corruptions, Days and Nights, Men and Beaſts have been from all Eternity. And firſt, I ſay, that it cannot be underſtood, according to the two firſt wayes, which require that one

thing

thing be related to, and agree with another in reſpect to every one in particular, as hath been ſaid; for every Generation, every Day, every Man in particular, hath not been from all Etern ty; elſe we that live at this Day ſhould have been from all Eternity; which is abſurd. Secondly, I ſay, It cannot be underſtood in the fourth manner; for when one thing is related to, or agrees with all taken together, onely, and not with every one in particular, nor becauſe of ſome one; then all are ſo neceſſary to eſtabliſh the truth of the Propoſition, that if you except or take one away, the Propoſition will be falſe: For Example in this Propoſition, The Kings of *France* have reigned twelve hundred fifty ſix years; the Reign of twelve hundred fifty ſix years are ſo to be applied to, and affirmed of all the Kings of *France* taken together, that if one or two were not numbred with the reſt, they would not have reigned ſo long, and conſequently the Propoſition ſhould be falſe. Thus in this Propoſition, The Apoſtles are in number twelve, the number twelve belongs to all the Apoſtles taken together ſo neceſſarily, that if one ſhould be taken away, or deducted out of that number, the Apoſtles ſhould not be in number

twelve

twelve, and conſequently the Propoſition ſhould be falſe. Therefore in this Propoſition, Men have been from all Eternity; If to have been from all Eternity, is proper to, and to be affirmed of all men taken together, only, and not of every man in particular, nor becauſe of ſome one that hath been from all Eternity; it follows that all men are ſo neceſſary to eſtabliſh the truth of the ſaid Propoſition, that if one or two are taken away, men ſhall not have been from all Eternity, and conſequently the Propoſition will be falſe: but according to the confeſſion of Atheiſts, Though one ſhould take away all the men that have been four thouſand years ſince, yet nevertheleſs they might have been from all Eternity and without beginning. Therefore in this Propoſition, Men have been from all Eternity; to have been from all Eternity, doth not belong to, nor is to be affirmed of all men taken together, only. Finally, ſince all men taken together, or the collection of all men, is not only two days ſince, much leſs from all Enity and without beginning: It muſt then be concluded, that the Propoſition in hand, *viz.* That Generations and Corruptions, Days and Nights, Men and Beaſts have been from all Eternity; muſt

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be underſtood by Atheiſts, in the third way or manner; that is to ſay, becauſe of ſome Generation, ſome Day, ſome Man, *&c.* that may have been from all Eternity: But I have proved already, that there hath been no Generation, no Day, no Man, *&c.* from all Eternity; and Atheiſts themſelves confeſs it in their firſt Anſwer Therefore it muſt be concluded, that Generations and Corruptions, Days and Nights, Men and Beaſts, *&c.* have by no means been from all Eternity.

4. Moreover, All the Old men which have been in time paſt, taken together, either have been from all Eternity, or not: if they have been from all Eternity, it follows that their Old age is Eternal, which is impoſſible: Seeing that which is Eternal, is not after another, there being nothing before that which is Eternal: But their Old age is after another; to wit, after their Youth: Therefore their Old age is not Eternal. A man's Young age may well be with the Young age, or after the Old age of another man; but the Youth of a Man, cannot be with, or after the Old age of the ſame Man, and Old age muſt neceſſarily be after: Now we ſpeak here of the ſame Men, that is, the ſame Old men; and conſequently the Old age of

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all Old men, ought neceſſarily to be after the Young age of the ſelf-ſame Old men that have been Young: if they have not been from all Eternity, it will follow that men will have been from all Eternity without Old age, or Old men; which is denied by Atheiſts themſelves, who affirm the World to have been from all Eternity in the ſame ſtate it is now, and conſequently with Old men. And moreover, Either men have been from all Eternity without Old men, during a finite time, or during an infinite time: If during a finite time, it will follow that betwixt that which is not from all Eternity, *viz.* Old men, and that which is not from all Eternity, *viz.* other men taken together, there is but a finite and limited time; and that the finite time, ſuch as is the time, ſince the which there are Old men, added to the finite time, ſuch as is the duration of Men, without Old men, will make up an infinite time, ſuch as is the pretended Eternity of Men; which is abſurd: If they have been from all Eternity without Old men, during an infinite time, it will follow, that Men will have been without Old men above a thouſand thouſands millions of thouſands of years; which is ridiculous, and denied by theſe prophane Atheiſts themſelves.

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By the ſame Reaſon one may prove, that all young men taken together, which have been in time paſt, have not been from all Eternity; ſeeing their Young age is after their Infancy: and one may prove alſo that all Children taken together, which have been in time paſt, have not been from all Eternity: Seeing their Infancy, is after their Birth and Conception. But if the Collection of all Children that have been, the Collection of all Young men that have been, and the Collection of all Old men that have been; If (I ſay) all theſe Collections have not been from all Eternity, it is evident that the Collection of all men which have been in time paſt, is not from all Eternity; ſince it compriſes only the Collection of Children, of Young and Old Men that have been.

5. Again, either all men which have been dead in time paſt, being taken together, have been dead from all Eternity, or not: If they have been dead from all Eternity, it follows that their death is Eternal, which is impoſſible; ſeeing that which is Eternal is not after another, there being nothing before that which is Eternal, and without beginning: but their death is after another, *viz.* their life; ſeeing the death and life of the ſame men

cannot

cannot be together; but their death ought to be neceſſarily after their life; therefore their death is not Eternal: If all men which have been dead taken together, have not been dead from all Eternity, it will follow, that men have been from all Eternity, without having any dead men; which is denied by Atheiſts, who affirm, That the World hath been from all Eternity, in the ſame ſtate it is now; and conſequently with dead men. And moreover, either men have been from all Eternity, without dead men, during a finite time, or during an infinite time: If during a finite time, it will follow that betwixt that which is not from all Eternity, to wit, dead men, and that which is from all Eternity, *viz.* the living Men taken together, there is but a finite and limited time; and that the finite time, that is to ſay, the time ſince the which there have been dead men, added to the finite time, ſuch as is the duration of living men only, will make up an infinite time, ſuch as is the pretended Eternity of men; which is contradictory. If during an infinite time, it will follow, that men will have been above an hundred thouſand millions of thouſands of years without dying, which is ridiculous, and denied by Atheiſts themſelves.

6. To this may be added this Argumen, That which is begotten, is begotten of another, ſeeing nothing begets or produces it ſelf: But all men which have been in time paſt taken together, have been begotten; ſeeing that according to the opinion of Atheiſts, in the Collection of all men which have been in time paſt, there is never a man not begotten: Therefore all men which have been in time paſt taken together, have been begotten of another. From this Argument I form another, thus, Whatſoever is begotten of another, is after that other; ſeeing that a man who begets another man, did exiſt before he begat him: But all men taken together have been begotten of another, as I have proved: Therefore all men taken together have been after another. From this laſt Syllogiſme, I will alſo form this, That which hath been from all Eternity, hath not been after another, ſeeing there is nothing before that which is Eternal: But all men taken together have been after another, as I have proved; Therefore all men taken together have not been from all Eternity.

7. Laſtly, The ſerious conſideration of the very terms of this diſtinction of *Oviedo*, will cauſe any rational men to reject

ject it as ridiculous: Men (ſaith he) have been from all Eternity; but no man hath been from all Eternity; the collection of men which have been in time paſt, is from all Eternity; but there is never a a man in all this Collection, from all Eternity: The Collection of Dayes is without beginning; but there is never a Day in all this Collection without beginning: as if one ſhould ſay the Kings Succeſſors of *William* the Conqueror have been ever ſince the year One thouſand fourſcore and ſeven, but there was never a King in that year.

CHAP. III.

1. *The ſecond Anſwer of Atheiſts*, viz. *that as in the After-Eternity, that is to ſay, in the future, there will be no laſt or farthermoſt; ſo in the Fore-Eternity, that is to ſay, in time paſt, there hath been no firſt or formoſt.* 2. *That Atheiſts compare unlike things, and the diſparity explained.* 3. *That reaſcending towards the time paſt, one may run through it, and ſo 'tis not infinite.* 4. *That the Succeſſion of Things cannot be Eternal; and why?*

1. BEfore I proceed any farther, one muſt take notice, that for the right underſtanding of theſe unuſual words, the Fore-Eternity and the After-Eternity; one muſt conceive that this day is the tie that knits and joyns them both together; ſo that the Fore-Eternity is a duration, from this day reaſcending upwards or through the time paſt, even to the infinite; and the After-Eternity is a duration from this day toward the future, even to the infinite.

This kind of Riddle being now clear, let us come to their Anſwer. As in the After-Eternity (ſay they) the Day ſhall Eternally be after the Night, and the Night after the Day, ſo that there ſhall never be a later Day, nor a later Night; our Hemiſphere will be Eternally lightned, after that of our Antipodes, and the Hemiſphere of our Antipodes after ours; ſo that there ſhall never be a later illumination: The Flowing of the Sea will be Eternally after the Ebbing, and the Ebbing after the Flowing; ſo that there will never be a later Flowing or Ebbing: The New Moon will be Eternally after the Full Moon, and the Full Moon after the New Moon, without ever being a later New Moon, or a later Full Moon; one part of Time or Motion

on will be Eternally after the other, without ever being a later part of Time and Motion, &c. So in the Fore-Eternity, the Day hath been Eternally before the Night, and the Night before the Day; ſo that there was never a firſt Day or a firſt Night: and conſequently the Day and the Night have been from all Eternity, one before another, as they will be Eternally one after another: Likewiſe our Hemiſphere hath been Enlightened Eternally before the Hemiſphere of our Antipodes, and that of our Antipodes before ours, without ever having been a firſt illumination; and conſequently illumination is Eternal ſucceſſively, and the two Hemiſpheres have been Enlightened from all Eternity, one before the other, as they ſhall be Enlightened Eternally one after another: So the New Moon hath been Eternally before the Full Moon, and the Full Moon before the New Moon, without ever having been a firſt New, or Full Moon; and conſequently the Full and the New Moon have been from all Eternity, one before the other, as they ſhall be Eternally one after another. *Item*, The Flowing of the Sea, hath been Eternally before the Ebbing, and the Ebbing before the Flowing, without ever having been a

first Flowing or Ebbing; and consequently the Flowing and the Ebbing have been from all Eternity, one before the other, as they shall be Eternally one after after the other, Finally, Every Day, every Illumination, every Flowing, every Man, have indeed had a Beginning, so that there is none of these in particular, that ever hath been without Beginning, and from all Eternity: But the Succession of Days, Illuminations, Flowings, and Men, *&c.* is without Beginning and from all Eternity.

The Reply.

2. Against this Answer I say, That the comparison is to no purpose, because things altogether unlike are compared in it, *viz.* that which hath been and that which never shall be totally; that which is totally past, and that which never shall pass away: For the Full and the New Moon, the Day and the Night, the Flowing and Ebbing of the Sea, the Illumination of both Hemispheres, Men, and such-like Successive things, that are pretended to have been from all Eternity, have been indeed, but are no more, and consequently are past; and therefore the pretended Fore-Eternity, being of this nature,

ture, is certainly paſt. To make then a true and even compariſon of Equal things, one ſhould ſuppoſe of the After-Eternity, that which is moſt certain of the Fore-Eternity, to wit, that it is altogether paſt. Now if the After-Eternity ſhould come to paſs away, and have an end, it would be finite, and conſequently there would be a later Day, and a later Night, a later Flowing and Ebbing, &c. and which is more than that, the After-Eternity ſhould be limited on every ſide, that is to ſay, by this Day, and by the later Day, becauſe it ſhould be paſt as the Fore-Eternity: Sith then, that the pretended Fore-Eternity is paſt, it muſt be alſo finite, and conſequently there hath been a firſt Day, a firſt Flowing, a Firſt Man, &c. and which is more, it is limited on every ſide, to wit, by this Day, and by the firſt Day as well as the After-Eternity would be, if it were paſt.

3. From this Reply it is evident, That though one deſcending towards the future, might go or reach to the infinite; yet re-aſcending towards that which is paſt, one could not reach to the infinite: becauſe in every progreſſion to the infinite, there is always ſomething to be taken in, ſo that one cannot run through ſuch an

infinite: Now re-aſcending from this Day to the time paſt, there is not always ſomething to be taken in, but one muſt ſtop at a firſt thing, and ſo by aſcending to the time paſt, all the time paſt muſt be taken in: Therefore in aſcending to the time paſt, there is no infinite to be reached unto.

That there is not always ſomething to be taken in, in aſcending to the time paſt; and that from this Day, aſcending to the time paſt, all that time paſt may be taken in, it is evident; becauſe to deſcend by the time paſt to this Day, and aſcend from this Day towards the time paſt, are one and the ſame thing, or at leaſt are things alike; as the way from *Thebes* to *Athens*, and from *Athens* to *Thebes*, is one and the ſame way, and all the time paſt either in aſcending, or deſcending, is always the ſame. Therefore ſince that deſcending by the time paſt to this Day, all the time paſt is taken in; it is evident that aſcending from this Day towards the time paſt, all the time paſt may be taken in, and conſequently there is no progreſſion to the infinite that way.

4. Finally, One cannot conceive, that there was never a Man, a Day, a Flowing of the Sea, *&c.* from all Eternity, and that

that notwithſtanding, the ſucceſſion of Men, Days, and Flowings, be from all Eternity, and without Beginning; for if there be no Men, no Days, from all Eternity and without Beginning, it is impoſſible the ſucceſſion of the ſame ſhould be from all Eternity, and without Beginning. Seeing the Succeſſion of things cannot be without the things, whereof it is Succeſſion: And moreover it is certain and undoubtable (and in this caſe is very conſiderable) that every Succeſſion compriſes Eſſentially many things, whereof one is after another; ſo that Succeſſion, not only, cannot have a Being, but which is more cannot be conceived, without ſuch things as are one after another: Now that which is after another cannot be Eternal: there being nothing before that which is Eternal, and without Beginning: Seeing then that Succeſſion comprehends Eſſentially ſuch a thing as is after another, it follows neceſſarily that Succeſſion in it ſelf cannot be Eternal; for if it be ſaid to be Eternal, it muſt be in relation to ſome one thing which is not after another, but without Beginning and from all Eternity, which is denied by Atheiſts themſelves; for they profeſs to believe, That there was never a Man, never a Day, &c. but they have been after

ter another (and by consequence cannot have been without Beginning) lest they be forced to confess that there hath been a first Man, a first Day, a first Flowing, &c. and consequently a Beginning, and so no Eternity of Men, Days, and Flowings, &c.

CHAP. IV.

1. *The third Answer of Atheists concerning the infinite number.* 2. *Three Arguments of Atheists, whereby they strive and endeavour to prove, that one infinite is greater than another.* 3. *That those Men which have been in time past, make up some number.* 4. *That in whatsoever number of Men, there is as much, or more, or less.* 5. *The refutation of the Atheists Argument, that one infinite is greater than another, materially, and not formally.* 6. *That it is a contradiction to grant, or make, one infinite to be greater than the other.* 7. *That the Answer of Atheists, doth not at all hit or touch our chief and indissoluble Reason, drawn from the distance of Men.* 8. *What the Space is not, and what it is proved.* 9. *The Answer to the*

the Atheiſts firſt Argument, drawn from the infiniteneſs of the Oriental and Occidental Space. 10. *Another Anſwer to their ſecond Argument, drawn from the infiniteneſs of the Thoughts, both of Men and Angels.* 11. *Another to their third Argument, drawn from the pretended infiniteneſs of Men and Lions poſſible, that is to ſay, that God may produce and create.*

1. THe third Anſwer of Atheiſts is, that there having been in time paſt an infiniteneſs of Men, Dayes, and Generations, *&c.* one cannot ſay that there hath been a number of them, either finite or infinite, ſeeing every number is called number, becauſe it may be numbred: Now the infiniteneſs of Men, Days, *&c.* cannot be numbred, and therefore theſe terms, number infinte, are contradictory; that is, one muſt confeſs, that Men, Days, *&c.* are in ſome number; they ſay that number is an infinite number; but that in the infinite number there is neither as much, nor more, nor leſs; ſeeing theſe particles, as much, more, and leſs. belong onely, and are ſolely related to finite numbers. And that if they be compelled by force of Reaſon to ac-

acknowledge that theſe particles belong to all numbers, either finite or infinite: they Anſwer that in the infinite number of Men (for Example) that have been in time paſt, there have been ſo many Men as Hands and Fingers; and that all infinite Numbers are equal. And if they be forced to confeſs that one infinite number is greater than the other, they underſtand it materially, that is in reference to the parts of it, and not formally, that is to ſay, in reference to the infiniteneſs of the ſame. And finally, if they be conſtrained to grant, that one infinite is greater than the other, both materially and formally; they ſay there is no abſurdity to grant one infinite to be greater than the other; and they endeavour to prove it by theſe three Reaſons. The firſt is drawn from the infinitenſs of the ſpace in this manner: If from the City of *London*, drawing perpetually Eaſt-ward, or to the Orient, there is no end to be attained unto; and conſequently the Oriental ſpace is infinite, and ſo are the parts of the ſame in infinite number; for as to have an end and to be finite, is one and the ſame thing; ſo not to have an end and to be infinite is one and the ſame thing. *Item* from the City of *London*, drawing per-

perpetually Weſtward, or to the Occident, there is no end, and conſequently the Occidental ſpace is infinite, and ſo are the parts of the ſame in infinite number, by the ſame reaſon: Now the Oriental and Occidental ſpace together are greater than the Oriental ſpace alone; ſeeing the Oriental and Occidental ſpace together, is as an All, whereof the Oriental ſpace is but one part, and *totum eſt Majus ſua parte*. Therefore one infinite, ſuch as is the Oriental and Occidental ſpace together, is greater than another infinite, ſuch as is the Oriental ſpace alone; and an infinite number, ſuch as is that of the parts of the Oriental and Occidental ſpace together, is greater than another infinite, ſuch as is that of the parts of the Occidental ſpace alone.

2. Their ſecond Reaſon is drawn from the infiniteneſs of the Thoughts of Men and Angels, thus: The Thoughts Men ſhall have hereafter, in the after-Eternity, whether in Earth or in Heaven, are in number infinite; for if they were in number finite, it would follow that Men being come unto that finite and limitted number of Thoughts, would think no more, and ſo would no more know God, nor any other Thing; ſeeing one cannot think

think on ſomething without knowing the ſame in ſome manner: *Item*, The Thoughts Angels ſhall have hereafter in the After-Eternity, are in number infinite, elſe at leaſt there would be a time wherein the Angels ſhould think no more: Now the Thoughts of Men and Angels together are in greater number than the Thoughts of Men alone: Therefore a number infinite, ſuch as is that of the Thoughts of Men and Angels together, in the After-Eternity, is greater than another infinite, ſuch as is that of the Thoughts of Men alone, in the ſame Eternity.

Their third reaſon is drawn from Men and Lions poſſible; and thus they argue. Men poſſible, that is to ſay, that God may produce, are in number infinite; for if they were in number finite, for Example, One hundred thouſand millions, it would follow that God could not produce one more, ſeeing that one Man would be over and above all Men poſſible: *Item* Lions poſſible, or that God may produce and create, are in number infinite for the ſame reaſon: Now the number of Men and Lions poſſible is greater than the ſole number of Men poſſible: Therefore a number infinite, ſuch as is that of Men and Lions poſſible

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together, is greater than another infinite, ſuch as is that of Men poſſible onely.

The Reply.

3. Againſt this Anſwer, I ſay firſt, That all Men which have been in time paſt are many, that is to ſay, are more than one, and conſequently make up a multitude, which in it ſelf is either numerable and finite, or innumerable and infinite: If it be numerable and finite, it follows that there hath been a certain number finite and determined in it ſelf; and ſo that there have been ſome firſt, ſome ſecond, *&c.* And therefore that they have not been from all Eternity: If it be innumerable and infinite, my argument is entire and firm: which is thus: One cannot give a greater multitude than an innumerable or infinite multitude, elſe it ſhould be exceeded, by this greater multitude: Seeing that of two multitudes the greater exceeds the leſſer, and conſequently ſhould be finite and limited; ſeeing that which is exceeded is finite and determined, where it is exceeded: But one can give a greater multitude than that of Men, which have been in time paſt; to wit, the multitude of Eyes, Fingers, Hairs, and Beaſts:

Beasts: Therefore the multitude of Men, which have been in time past, is not infinite, but finite and termined, and consequently hath not been from all Eternity, And here observe that in this place I use the words of multitude and number for one and the same thing.

4. Secondly, It is false, That in an infinite multitude, or an infinite number, there is neither as much, nor more, nor less; for in whatsoever multitude of Men, either finite or infinite, it is certain that there are as many Noses as Mouths, as many Hearts as Heads, as many Hands as Feet; and it is undoubtable that in the multitude of Men, which have been in time past, there have been more Hands and Fingers than Men; seeing there is no Man in the Collection of all Men, which have been in time past (Monsters excepted) but he hath had two Hands and ten Fingers; and no Man can deny that the Collection of all Animals which have been in time past, is greater than the sole Collection of all Men which have been in time past; seeing the Collections of all Animals contains the Collection of all Men, and of all Beasts. But the Collection of all Men and of all Beasts, is greater than the Collection of all Men only; else the whole, to wit,

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the Collection of all Men and of all Beasts, should not be greater than the Parts; to wit, the Collection of all Men onely. By the same reason one may prove that the Collection of all Days, and of all Nights, is greater than the Collection of all Days onely: and that the Collection of all Generations and Corruptions is greater than the Collection of all Generations onely; and consequently, that the Collections of Days and Generations which have been in time past, are exceeded, and so finite and determined, where they are exceeded; and therefore are not from all Eternity, but have had a Beginning: Finally, In whatsoever great multitude, or whatsoever great number, either finite or infinite, there are more binaries than quarternaries, seeing every quarternary contains two binaries.

5. Thirdly, It is in vain to say that one infinite is not greater than another formally, that is to say, in respect to the infiniteness; but that it is so materially, that is to say, in respect to the Parts; because it is evident that the parts properly make the infinite; and therefore if one infinite hath more parts than another infinite, it will be greater than that, even as an infinite; and moreover, though

one infinite ſhould be greater than another materially, that is to ſay, in reſpect to the parts, it will follow that the leſſer ſhall not be truly infinite; ſeeing it will finiſh and be determined, where the other will begin to exceed it.

6. Fourthly, it is falſe, there is no abſurdity of two infinites to make one greater than the other: for from thence will follow an apparent contradiction, to wit, that one and the ſame thing, will be finite and will not be finite; ſeeing the leſſer infinite will be exceeded by the greater infinite, and conſequently will be finite; ſeeing that which is exceeded, is finite and determined where it is exceeded: And it will not be finite, ſeeing it is ſuppoſed infinite, and that which is infinite is not finite: Therefore the ſame thing, to wit, the leſſer infinite, will be finite and not finite, which things are contradictory.

Fifthly, The Anſwer of Atheiſts doth not at all hit or touch our chief and indiſſoluble Reaſon, drawn from the diſtance of men, thus: The men which have lived in time paſt till now, are all diſtant one from another with an infinite diſtance of time only, or with a finite diſtance only; or ſome are diſtant with a finite diſtance,

ſtance, and others with an infinite diſtance ; if they are all diſtant with an infinite diſtance of time, it will follow, that betwixt King *Charles* the Firſt, and King *Charles* the Second, there will be an infinite diſtance of time; which is altogether abſurd : if they are all diſtant with a finite diſtance of time only, it follows that their duration contains a finite time only, and conſequently are not Eternal, which is moſt true : If ſome are diſtant with a finite diſtance, and others with an infinite diſtance , and that of all them which are only diſtant with a finite diſtance, one takes the two remoteſt ; for Example, *Peter* who liveth at this day, and then remounts towards them that have preceded *Peter*, and from whom he is deſcended, if one takes him (I ſay) who in a finite diſtance is the remoteſt, to wit, *John* , I ſay, that if one remounts a little higher, that is to ſay, unto *William*, the father of *John* ; it will follow that *Peter* and *William* will be diſtant one from another, with an infinite diſtance of time ; ſeeing they are more diſtant and farther removed than *Peter* and *John*, which are the farther removed in a finite diſtance : So that it will follow, that betwixt the finite diſtance , which is between *Peter* and

John, and the infinite diſtance which is between *Peter* and *William*, there will be but a very few years difference, that is to ſay, ſo many years (and no more) as are between *William* the father, and *John* the ſon; which is altogether abſurd.

This Reaſon may be confirmed thus: Every multitude actually exiſting, or having actually exiſted, if it be actually finite, it may be told; ſeeing that which cannot be told is neceſſarily infinite: therefore if from this day, remounting towards the time paſt, one begins to tell thoſe men which have been ſucceſſively one before another; the whole finite multitude of thoſe men, will at laſt be told and numbred; ſo that beyond that multitude there will remain never a man to be numbred, that may with the ſaid multitude, make a finite number: Therefore if to the finite multitude of all men, which have been in time paſt, one adds only a man, the reſult of it will be an infinite multitude; ſeeing the precedent multitude, without that man added, was the greateſt of all finite multitudes paſt; nay, even the whole finite multitude of men which have been in time paſt; and ſo that man added to the whole finite multitude of thoſe men, making the ſame greater, it muſt neceſſarily be infinite:

nite: Moreover, it cannot be infinite, ſeeing a finite thing, to wit, a man added to another finite thing, as the whole finite multitude of men, cannot make an infinite: and though never one man ſhould be added to the ſaid multitude, there would follow an evident contradiction; for there being as many more feet as men, it will follow that the feet will be finite, and not finite in number; they will be finite, becauſe one finite, to wit, the whole finite multitude of men, and the double of this finite, to wit, the feet of theſe men, do not make one infinite; Alſo they will not be finite, becauſe the number of feet is greater than the whole finite multitude of men, which is ſuppoſed to be the greateſt number of all finite things.

And it is no ſtrong Argument, to ſay, as *Oviedo* in his Natural Philoſophy, Controv. the 14th. Propoſ. 3. Paragraff 9th. There is never ſo great a finite number, but a greater may be always given, *in infinitum*; ſo that one cannot cannot properly ſay, the greater of finite numbers: for though it be true in things poſſible, that is to ſay, that God may produce and create; ſeeing God having created, for Example, a great number of men, may create and produce ſtill a

greater number, and always, a greater; but alſo always finite *in infinitum*; nevertheleſs in things actually exiſting, or having actually exiſted, as the Queſtion is now, it is certain that there is a finite number, which is the greateſt of all finite numbers; and it is falſe that in a multitude actually preſent or paſt, there is no number finite, but will always admit of a greater number, and always greater, *in infinitum*; ſeeing if there were always a greater, and always a greater finite number, it would follow that the actual finite number could never be told, and conſequently ſhould be infinite; for that which is finite only cannot be told.

Further, All men which have been in time paſt are not diſtant one from another, with an infinite diſtance of time, elſe my Father and I ſhould be infinitely diſtant one from another; therefore all men muſt be diſtant one from another, with a finite diſtance, and conſequently muſt have laſted but a finite time, and muſt have made up but a finite multitude, or ſome muſt be diſtant with a finite diſtance, and others with an infinite diſtance; in which caſe thoſe that are diſtant with a finite diſtance only, taken together, will have laſted but a finite time,

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and will make up but a finite multitude, and will make up the whole multitude finite, ſo that there will be no greater multitude, as I have ſhewed already. And it ſignifies but little, to ſay with *Oviedo* in the above-cited place, that all theſe things are true of a finite number, when it is determined and ſpecified; as for Example, of the number of an hundred thouſand, or an hundred thouſand millions, or a thouſand times an hundred thouſand millions, *&c.* but are not true of a finite number uncertain, undetermined, and not ſpecified; for in thoſe things which actually exiſt, or have actually exiſted, as the Queſtion is at preſent, the number is always certain and determined; and if it be uncertain and undetermined, it is not in it ſelf, but in reſpect of our ſelves who cannot determine it, becauſe it is too great.

To this you may add this conſideration, That that which is Eternal and without Beginning, is not after another; there being nothing before that which is Eternal: Now the Sons have been after the Fathers, Death after Life, Old Age after Young Age, Young Age after Infancy, Infancy after Birth, and Birth after Conception: Therefore Sons, Dead Men, Old Men, Young Men, Children; all Men

Born are not from all Eternity and without Beginning.

8. Now I muſt anſwer at large the three Objection; mentioned in the third Anſwer of Atheiſts, by which they pretend to prove, not onely that there is an infinite, but that an infinite is greater than another; for at firſt ſight they appear ſo ſtrong, that they muſt needs be examined narrowly, to take away the offence they might otherwiſe give to the weak.

The firſt Objection drawn from the infiniteneſs of the Oriental and Occidental ſpace cannot be well reſolved, until we have firſt taken a view, and attained to ſome knowledge of the eſſence of place or ſpace: Therefore I ſhall ſhew firſt of all, what the ſpace is not, and what it is, then I ſhall anſwer the objection.

For the firſt, I ſay, That the place or ſpace muſt of all neceſſity be ſomething or nothing at all: Now one cannot truly ſay that the ſpace is nothing at all, or a meer nothing; therefore it muſt be ſomething. That the ſpace is not a meer nothing, appears, becauſe a meer nothing is capable of nothing, and can do nothing; becauſe a meer nothing and an impoſſibility do not differ: Now the ſpace is capable of ſomething and can do ſomething;

thing; ſeeing it is capable to receive the Bodies, and truly it is the receptacle of all Bodies; ſince that all Bodies occupy ſome ſpace: therefore the ſpace is not a meer nothing. Moreover, Betwixt two nothings there is no difference; but the ſpace and that which is between two Bodies, touching one another, do differ greatly: therefore the ſpace and that which is between two Bodies touching one another, are not two nothings; and ſince that which is between two Bodies touching one another, is a meer nothing; the ſpace ought neceſſarily not to be a meer nothing: Now that the ſpace and that which is between two Bodies touching one another, do greatly differ, appears, becauſe a Body cannot be put between two Bodies touching one another, but a Body may be put in the ſpace.

Having ſhewed that the ſpace is not a meer nothing, but that it is ſomething; it muſt neceſſarily be ſomething real, or ſomething fained and imaginary; but the ſpace is not ſomething fained and forged by humane wit, ſeeing that the ſpace hath exiſted, and hath been occupied by the Heavens, the Earth, the Sea, before ever Man was; ſo far it is from being fained and forged by Humane Wit; and all Bodies occupy a ſpace, though

though we do not obſerve it, or think of it: Therefore the ſpace is ſomething real.

Again, Every real being is either a ſubſtance or an accident; becauſe every real being is either inherent to ſome ſubject, and depending of the ſame, that is to ſay, ſo tied and faſtened to the ſubject, that it cannot be without it, and ſo is an accident, or is not inherent, and tyed to ſome ſubject, and depending on the ſame, but may exiſt alone, and ſo is a ſubſtance: But the ſpace is not inherent and tied to ſome ſubject, and conſequently is not an accident: Therefore the ſpace is a ſubſtance. That the ſpace is not inherent to ſome ſubject, for Example, to ſome Body, appears, becauſe that which is inherent and tied to the Body, moves with the Body, or according to the motion of the Body: So the Colour of a Horſe moves according to the motion of the Horſe; the Blackneſs of a Crow moves according to the motion of the Crow; and the Figure of a Man, moves according to the motion of a Man, *&c.* But the ſpace occupied by the Body, doth not move with the Body; or according to the motion of the Body: Therefore the ſpace occupied by the Body, is not inherent and tied to the Body. That

That the ſpace does not move according to the motion of the Body, appears, becauſe a Body by its motion, leaves one place and takes another, and having occupied one place, occupies another preſently; beſides if place or the ſpace ſhould move according to the motion of the Body, it would follow that a Body going from *London* to *Oxford*, ſhould not ſtir nor budge from its place, and would always be in the ſame place; ſeeing the place or ſpace would alwayes accompany him. Nay, *Ariſtotle* and all other Philoſophers before and after him, did all confeſs that place or the ſpace was altogether immoveable. And it is in vain to ſay, that in the ſame time that a Body leaves the place or ſpace, it did occupie; another Body ſucceeds, to which the ſpace is inherent and tied: for beſides that the general Maxime received of all, ſhould be deſtroyed: That an accident never paſſes from one ſubject to another, and that it cannot be ſeparated from its ſubject, but by periſhing; it is evident that the place or ſpace is no more inherent to the Body, than a Chamber to thoſe Men that are in it; than the Ocean to Fiſhes, the Air to Birds, and the Firmament to the Stars; all which notwithſtanding are ſubſtances: It is evi-

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dent that the Bodies leave places, and tend to places, and that place or ſpace is indifferent to all ſorts of Bodies, and never ties it ſelf to any.

Add hereto, that the place or ſpace was before the Body, and that if there had not been a ſpace before the World, it would have been impoſſible to make the World; and if there were no ſpaces beyond the World, it ſhould be impoſſible to put a Body there: and therefore ſeeing the ſpace was before the Body, one cannot ſay it is an accident of the Body; for an accident is never before its ſubject. If any one ſay that God created the ſpace with the World; and if he would create ſome other Worlds, he would alſo create other Spaces with them; and that beyond the World there is no ſpace: Againſt that I ſay that where there is nothing at all, one cannot create neither Body nor Space: For Example, Between two Bodies touching one another, there is nothing at all; ſo that neither Body nor ſpace can be created there: therefore, if beyond the World there is nothing at all, God cannot create there, neither Body nor Space; and if before the Creation of the World, there was nothing at all where the World is, God could not have created there

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neither Body nor Space; becauſe that betwixt two meer nothings there is no difference; and we are to judge alike of things that do not differ: Therefore if the meer nothing that is between two Bodies touching one another, is capable of nothing, and neither Body nor Space can be created there; neither the meer nothing, that theſe Men ſay is beyond the World, and the meer nothing, that they ſay was where the World is before the Creation of the ſame, will be capable of nothing, and one cannotcreate there neither Body nor Space.

Moreover, God is not in a meer nothing, and one cannot ſay, that God is where there is nothing at all; for Example, God is not between two Bodies touching one the other totally, becauſe between ſuch Bodies there is nothing at all: But God is beyond the World, and before the World, he was where the World is: Therefore one cannot ſay, that beyond the World there is nothing at all; and that where the World is before the Creation of the ſame, there was nothing at all; ſo that there was ſomething, which can be no other than the ſpace. That God is beyond the World, and that before the Creation, he was where the World is;

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appears, becauſe nothing can act, where it is not, neither by it ſelf, nor by its virtue and power: But God did act where the world is, in creating the ſame there, and God can act beyond the World, creating there other Bodies, and other Worlds: Therefore God is beyond the World, and before the World was where the World is, both by himſelf and by his power; Seeing the Power of God is nothing elſe but God himſelf. For God being moſt ſimple, all that is in God, or can be conceived to be in God, ought neceſſarily to be God himſelf. And certainly, if God were only in the World, he ſhould be finite, as well as the World, and ſo ſhould not be God; for by the word, *GOD*, Men have always underſtood an infinite Being.

Finally, To ſpeak abſolutely, and without any reſpect to God's will to create but one world; I think God may create another World, diſtant from this; in which caſe there would be an interval or ſpace between the two Worlds, in which ſpace God ſhould be, elſe he would be divided from himſelf, ſeeing that he ſhould exiſt in the two Worlds, without exiſting between both.

Having proved that place or ſpace is not an Accident, it is eaſie to ſhew, that it

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is not the Superficies, or Surface of ſuch a Body as compaſſes another. Firſt, Becauſe according to the common opinion of Philoſophers, the Superficies is an Accident: But we have ſufficiently proved, that place or ſpace is not an Accident; therefore it is not a Superficies. Secondly, The higher Heaven occupies a place and a ſpace, and the World is neceſſarily in one place, and occupies and fills neceſſarily ſome ſpace, and yet the World and the higher Heavens are compaſſed with no Superficies nor any other Body.

Thirdly, The Superficies or Surface of that Body that compaſſes another, is immoveable, as it may be ſeen in a Tower, agitated with great Winds, in a Tree in the midſt of a River, *&c.* But place or ſpace is wholly immoveable, as I have proved already; which may be confirmed thus: If place were an external Superficies, it would follow, that a Body that ſtirs not, yet ſhould move, and that a Body that moves, ſhould not ſtir from its place: That it would follow, that a Body that ſtirs not, yet ſhould move locally, appears; becauſe a Tower, a Caſtle that ſtirs not, changes its external Superficies when it is agitated with great winds; and a Tree, that is in the midſt of a River, without budging, changes its external

external Superficies; and therefore if place is an external Superficies, to wit, the Surface of a Body that compaſſes another; It is evident, that a Body that budges not, receiving any change or alteration of Surface or Superficies, will alſo change its place, and move it ſelf locally, which is altogether abſurd: That it would follow alſo, that a Body which ſhould move it ſelf locally, ſhould not budge out of its place, appears, becauſe a Body which moves it ſelf locally, may retain the Superficies of the Body that compaſſeth it, and conſequently may retain its very place; but that which is in one and the ſame place, do's not budge at all out of it.

Fourthly, It is certain that by local motion, one leaves one place, and paſſes unto another, ſince, a local motion, is nothing elſe, but a motion towards another place: now by the local motion, a Body do's not neceſſarily leave a Superficies, and neceſſarily acquire another; for Example, If God ſhould move a Body beyond the World, in the inanity, or in an empty place, that he ſhould have made, that Body ſhould not be compaſſed with any Superficies: Therefore, the Superficies of a Body that compaſſes another, is not a true place to ſpeak

Finally,

Finally, The Superficies of a Body is a kind of quantity, and quantity is a property of the Body, or the Body it ſelf; and therefore ſince a Body is in a place, the quantity and conſequently the Superficies alſo, muſt be in a place, and not place it ſelf; elſe place ſhould be in another place, and this other place in another place, *in infinitum*; which is abſurd. They being not able to obtund the edge and force of theſe Arguments, their refuge is to ſay, that place is not ſimply the Superficies of a Body that compaſſes another; but that it is ſuch a Superficies, as is joyned with order and relation to certain fixed Points of the World, as are the Center of the World, and the Four Cardinal Points of it, to wit, the Eaſt, and the Weſt, the North, and the South: for the Superficies retaining the ſaid order and relation to theſe fixed Points, is ſaid to be immoveable: and by this means they pretend to explain the manner in the which a Body changes place, to wit, whether it draws near to, or leaves, that is to ſay, departs from theſe fixed Points of the World: For Example, If a Body aſcends, they ſay it moves, becauſe it departs from the Center of the World; if it deſcends, it moves, becauſe it draws near to the Center of the World, which

is the Center of the Earth; if it goes towards the Pole *Artick*, it moves, becauſe it draws near to the North, and departs from the South.

Againſt this Anſwer, I ſay, firſt, That a thing which ſhould not move nor ſtir from its place, would nevertheleſs change place; for if God ſhould move the Heavens with a direct Motion, the Earth remaining immoveable, it would follow that the Earth which ſhould not move, would change the Order and Relation (according to theſe Mens Doctrine) it hath to thoſe fixed Points of the World, and ſhould be either nearer or farther from them; Seeing theſe fixed Points being in the Heavens, ſhould move with the Heavens: and therefore if place ſhould conſiſt and reſide in ſuch a relation to the fixed Points of the World, the Earth having no more the ſaid relation, ſhould have the ſaid place no more; and conſequently would change place, without budging and ſtirring from the ſame place, and without moving locally; all which is abſurd.

Secondly, It would follow that a Body ſhould move locally, without ever changing place; for if God ſhould move locally the whole World, with a direct motion, and that all the parts of the World ſhould remain

remain in their proper ſituation, it would follow that the Earth ſhould move locally, with the whole World, and yet retain the ſame order and relation it hath, to the fixed Points of the World; and therefore if place ſhould reſide and conſiſt in ſuch a relation, the Earth retaining the ſame relation, ſhould alſo retain the ſame place, and conſequently would not change place in moving locally; all which is impoſſible.

Thirdly, If God ſhould reduce or bring back all things to nothing, one ſtone excepted, it is certain this ſtone ſhould exiſt in a place, and occupy a ſpace; and yet it would have neither order nor relation, to theſe fixed Points of the World, ſeeing there would be none, and conſequently place and ſpace, do not conſiſt in a certain order or relation, to the fixed Points of the World, ſeeing that place and ſpace may be without them.

Finally, This ſuperficies and relation to the fixed Points of the World, according to the opinion of Atheiſts, is an accident: but I have fully proved above, that place or ſpace is not an accident: from all which it do appear, that place or ſpace being not an accident, it muſt neceſſarily be a ſubſtance: Now all Sub-

ſtance, according to the common Opinion of Philoſophers, is either Corporal or Uncorporal, that is, either a Body or a Spirit: Seeing then that place or ſpace is not a Body, it muſt neceſſarily be a Spirit: That place or ſpace is not a Body, appears; becauſe a Body is impenetrable with another Body; but the place or ſpace is penetrable, with all ſorts of Bodies: Moreover, Every Body may move, for moveableneſs is the property of the Body; but the place or ſpace is immoveable, as I have proved already. In one word, Every Body is in a place, and occupies a ſpace: but place is not in a place, elſe there would be *progreſſus in infinitum*, and a ſpace doth not occupy another place by the ſame reaſon; therefore place or ſpace is not a Body. Since that place or ſpace, is not an accident, but a ſubſtance, and that 'tis not a Body as I have proved juſt now, it muſt neceſſarily be a Spirit: Now every Spirit is either Humane, or Angelical, or Divine; that is to ſay, it is either a reaſonable Soul, or an Angel, or a God. Therefore place or ſpace being a Spirit, muſt be one of the three: But it is eaſie to ſhew, that place or ſpace, is neither a reaſonable Soul nor an Angel; becauſe reaſonable Souls and Angels are in ſome

ſort moveable, for they are ſometimes in a place, and ſometimes in another; but the ſpace is wholly immoveable. Moreover, Souls and Angels are finite, and are onely in the World, but Space is infinite, and is beyond the World; as I have proved above.

Beſides, There being never a drop of the Ocean, never ſo ſmall parcel of the Air, Fire, or Earth, but it doth occupy a place: And there being never a part of the World, let it be never ſo ſmall, but it does occupy a ſpace, it would follow, that there would be never a bit of Sand, never a Drop of the Ocean, never a Leaf of a Tree, never ſo ſmall a parcel of the Air, and Earth, but therein would be a reaſonable Soul, or an Angel, and all the World would be filled, with Angels or reaſonable Souls, which is altogether abſurd. Upon this ground, ſome conclude that place or ſpace is nothing elſe but the *Immenſity* and *Infiniteneſs* of *GOD*, and conſequently *GOD* Himſelf; and ſo proceed to anſwer the Arguments of Atheiſts drawn from the infiniteneſs of the Oriental and Occidental Space: thus:

One muſt argue and diſcourſe of the Immenſity of God in reſpect to Bodies, as of his Eternity, in reſpect to Times

and Ages. Therefore as Eternity, which is the Divinity it ſelf, being indiviſible, and without parts, is always the ſame, before Ages, with Ages, and after Ages, if they come to paſs away: So that the Eternity, which was before time, and that which is with time, the Eternity which was in the time of *Adam*, of *Noah*, and of Jeſus Chriſt, and that which is in this preſent time, are not many Eternities, nor many parts of Eternity, but one and the ſame Eternity of God, which is as the receptacle of all Ages and Times; So that the Age of *Adam*, the Age of *Noah*, the Age of Jeſus Chriſt, and all other Ages and Times whatſoever, are in the ſame Eternity, and do not differ in duration, in reſpect to Eternity, which remaining always immutable, correſponds to all things and to all Ages; but they do differ in themſelves, in that Times and Ages being neceſſarily and eſſentially Succeſſive, cannot be together; So Immenſity, which is the Divinity it ſelf being alſo indiviſible and without parts, remains always the ſame, before the Bodies, with the Bodies, and after the Bodies, if they ſhould happen to be deſtroyed; So that the Immenſity which is beyond the World, and that which is where the World is; the Immenſity

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wherein the Sun is, and the Immenſity wherein the Earth is, are not many Immenſities, nor many parts of the Immenſity, but one and the ſame Immenſity, which is the receptacle of all Bodies : So that Heaven and Earth, the Sea and all other Bodies whatſoever, are in the ſame Immenſity, and do not differ in internal place, in reſpect to Immenſity, which is the true and proper place of all Bodies; but differ in external place in themſelves, in that being neceſſarily extended and impenetrable, they cannot be together, and cannot be compaſſed of the ſame Superficies.

And though Philoſophers (for the moſt part) do attribute to the Eternity and Immenſity of God, Virtual Parts, and a Virtual Extenſion, as well to diſtinguiſh the Eternity from the moment of time, and the Immenſity from the indiviſible Point, as becauſe they hold the frailty of humane Spirit to be ſo great, that it cannot conceive ſo long a duration as Eternity is, nor ſo long a ſpace as Immenſity is, without parts and extenſion : Nevertheleſs it is moſt certain, that God knows all things as they are, and he that knows perfectly his Eternity and Immenſity, conceives them without parts and extenſion; and yet he knows Eternity diſtant

from the moment of time, and Immenſity diſtinct from the inviſible Point.

And it is to no purpoſe to ſay, That by theſe Virtual Parts, Philoſophers meant not true parts; but only ſomewhat equivalent to theſe parts: So that Eternity hath ſomewhat equivalent to the actual parts of time, which have or may have run during Eternity; and Immenſity hath ſomewhat equivalent to the Bodies or parts of the Bodies, which are in the Immenſity: For as it cannot be truly ſaid, that a Rock ſtanding in the midſt of a River, hath ſo many virtual parts, as there are actual parts of waters, that run and beat it, whileſt the Rock ſtands and remains always the ſame, in its firmneſs and unmoveableneſs: So it cannot be truly ſaid, that the Eternity of God, hath ſo many virtual parts, as there are actual parts, which run and as it were ſlide away, whileſt Eternity remains always the ſame in its Immutability: neither can it be ſaid that the Immenſity of God hath ſo many Virtual parts, as there are actual parts of the Bodies, that are in this Immenſity.

It is ſafer then to call things by their own name, and not give them that, which they have not; and therefore parts muſt not be attributed to the Eternity

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and Immenſity of God, ſeeing they can have none: but one muſt ſay only, that the Eternity of God, being indiviſible and without parts, was neceſſarily before time, and is now with time, and ſhall ever be the ſame, with or without time. So that the whole ſingle Eternity correſponds to all times; and that the Immenſity of God, being alſo indiviſible and without parts, was neceſſarily before the Bodies, and is now with the Bodies, and ſhall ever be the ſame with or without Bodies; ſo that the whole ſingle Immenſity, correſponds to all the parts of all the Bodies, that are in this Immenſity.

They do not abſolutely deny, That humane Spirit, becauſe of its great weakneſs, in ſo high myſteries, cannot conceive the Eternity and Immenſity of God, without attributing to them ſomewhat equivalent to the actual parts of Times and Bodies: That it cannot conceive the duration of God, ſince ſix thouſand years and very near that the World laſteth, without attributing to theſame ſomewhat equivalent, to the ſix thouſand years; and that it cannot conceive the Divinity co-exiſtent with all the Bodies of the World, without attributing to the ſame ſomewhat equivalent to the actual extenſion of all Bodies.

If

If God ſhould aboliſh and reduce this World to nothing, and ſhould alſo create another, but not immediately after, they aſſure that the Spirit of Man cannot conceive the duration betwixt the two Worlds, without conceiving ſome ſpace of time, or ſomewhat eqvivalent to the ſpace of time: And if God ſhould create another World, which would not touch this, they think that the Spirit of Man, cannot conceive the interval, that would be between the two Worlds, without conceiving ſome corporal extenſion, or ſomewhat equivalent to this extenſion. But they think alſo, that God conceiving the duration or interval, that ſhould be between the two Worlds, would conceive them otherwiſe, without ſpace of time or corporal extenſion. And that if any will attribute to the Eternity and Immenſity of God, ſome virtual parts, that is to ſay, equivalent and correſpondent to the actual parts of Times and Bodies; They ſay, that the ſame is ſo far from blunting the edge and force of their Arguments, that it favours them greatly, as will appear anon.

And ſo anſwering the Objection preciſely, they ſay, That the Oriental ſpace, and the Occidental ſpace, are nothing elſe, than Oriental Immenſity, and the Oc-

Occidental Immenſity: and therefore as the Orienta lImmenſity, and the Occicidental Immenſity, really and in themſelves, are not two Immenſities, nor two parts of Immenſity, but are really one and the ſame Immenſity, which is called Oriental and Occidental, only in reſpect to the Oriental and Occidental Bodies, that are or may be in this Immenſity. So the Oriental ſpace, and the Occidental ſpace, are not really and in themſelves two different things, but one and the ſame thing, which is called Oriental ſpace, and Occidental ſpace, in reſpect to the Oriental and Occidental Bodies, that are or may be in the ſame.

Moreover, as Immenſity, though Infinite, is Indiviſible, and without Parts, as the Divinity from which it it is not diſtinct. So Space being nothing than the Immenſity of God, though it be infinite, is alſo Indiviſible and without Parts.

Finally, Even as a man, and a rational Animal, are not greater, and have no more parts than man alone; becauſe a man and a rational Animal are one and the ſame thing: So the Oriental and Occidental Immenſity, or the Oriental and Occidental Space, are not greater, and have no more parts, than the Oriental Immenſity alone, or the Oriental Space

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alone, becauſe the Oriental and Occidental Immenſity, or the Oriental and Occidental Space, are one and the ſame thing.

And if one will allow, or ſuppoſe ſome virtual parts in the Eternity and Immenſity of God, and ſays that the Eternity and Immenſity of God have ſome virtual Replications, according to the multitudes of Times and Bodies, to the which the Eternity and Immenſity of God correſpond. They ſay, that as the Age of *Adam* was in a part or virtual Replication of Eternity, and the Age of *Noah* in another: So Heaven is in one part, or virtual Replication of Immenſity, and the Earth in another; and that we are thus to argue of other Times and Bodies.

And if any ſay, That all things propounded hitherto, are incomprehenſible, and altogether incredible: They anſwer, That God dwelling in an Inacceſſible Light, one muſt not wonder, if Incomprehenſibility is one of his Properties and Attributes; And ſeeing the Eternity and Immenſity of God are nothing elſe than God himſelf, one muſt not think it ſtrange, that they are incomprehenſible, and cannot be perfectly conceived by humane Spirit. Therefore (ſay they) all things pro-

propounded hitherto, concerning the Eternity, the Space, or Immenſity of God, are indeed incomprehenſible ; but they have this advantage, that they are not contradictory : whereas all other ways of Arguing, concerning Eternity, Space, or Immenſity, ſeem to involve many abſurdities and contradictions, alleadged in this Tract. For my part, I think this Anſwer ought to ſatisfie any one that is not contentious ; but becauſe it is not common, and may be accuſed of Novelty; and indeed is not without difficulty, I ſubmit to the Judgment of my Betters and Superiours.

But if this Anſwer does not ſatisfie, one muſt ſay, That ſpace or the place of Bodies is the Eternal, without action, and infinite *Inanity* of Ancient Philoſophers, which is neither Body or Spirit, nor Accident, nor active Subſtance ; but only ſuch a thing as is capable to receive all Bodies, and which having them, is always infinitely beyond them. And yet this *Inanity* muſt neceſſarily be ſuppoſed without parts really different ; Elſe the Objection of our Adverſaries will remain in its full force : for the Oriental and Occidental *Inanity* being infinite and greater than the ſole Oriental *Inanity*, it would follow, that an infinite ſhould be

greater

greater than another; which is absurd. And because such an *Inanity*, without parts, will hardly please, and receive admittance amongst sober, judicious, learned Men; I return to the first Answer, and ground my Arguing upon it, yet submiting it to the judgment and censure of those that have attained to a deeper knowledge of these matters.

10. Their second Objection, drawn from the pretended infiniteness of the thoughts, both of Men and Angels, for the time to come may be resolved two ways:

First, In saying that God will give to every Man, and to every Angel in particular, one onely light and brightness of Glory, by which he shall possess and enjoy God Eternally; and consequently that every Man and every Angel, shall have but one onely thought, by which he shall be fastened as it were, upon God Eternally: Therefore seeing that all Men and all Angels will be in number finite; so the thoughts of Men and Angels will be in number finite.

Secondly, Since I think that the thoughts, or the repetition of the same thoughts, shall always be divers in number; I answer that the thoughts of Men and Angels for the time to come, shall be

be finite to the infinite, that is to ſay, ſhall increaſe alwayes, and perpetually be in greater number, and alwayes in greater number, but alwayes alſo in finite number: And though to every Day, to every Moneth, to every Year: to every Age, and to every Time whatſoever in particular, this finite number of Thoughts be definite and determined, ſo that God may aſſign and determine the number of the Thoughts of Men and Angels, which have been in time paſt to that Day, that Moneth, that Year, that Age, and that time incluſively: nevertheleſs if one ſpeaks indefinitely, without ſpecifying, neither Day, nor Moneth, nor Year, nor Age, nor any other Time in particular, but asks ſimply, in what number will the Thoughts of Men and Angels be for the time to come? No other anſwer can be given, but that the number of their Thoughts, ſhall be finite to the infinite, or that their number is finite indefinitely, and undeterminedly; for, becauſe of the perpetuity of Thoughts one cannot aſſign or determine a certain number, beyond which one ſhall have no more Thoughts.

And if one demands further, The Collection of all the Thoughts which ſhall be for the time to come, ſuppoſed they

they have never an end, what number is it of? I answer, That Collection is impossible, and consequently a meer nothing, because all future Thoughts, taken distributively, are future, but not taken collectively, seeing they shall never be collected and gathered, and that there will be still some to come to pass; and consequently to be collected and gathered: One may also demand whether the number of the future Thoughts of Men and Angels, which God knows is finite or infinite? To which I answer, That God knows Things as they are in themselves, and that he knows future Things no otherwise then they shall be in themselves; for the knowledge of God is alwayes true, and consequently alwayes conformable to the things known. Therefore seeing that the Thoughts of Men and Angels, shall always be finite to the infinite, and that their number shall always be finite indefinitely; it is evident that God knows them no otherwise, then as finite to the infinite, and that he knows certainly, that their number is finite and indefinitely, which will appear more plainly in our Answer to the third Objection.

11. Their third Objection drawn from the pretended infiniteness of Men and Lions

Lions poſſible, that is to ſay, that God may produce and create, may be reſolved the ſame way as the firſt; to wit, ſaying that Men and Lions poſſible are finite to the infinite, and that the number of them is finite, not definitely and determinedly, ſo that one may aſſign a certain number, beyond which none will be poſſible; but is infinite indefinitely, becauſe there is never ſo great a nmmber of Men and Lions, but God may produce and create a greater, and always a greater, and ſtill a greater, but notwithſtanding always finite. If it be objected that the Collection of all Men poſſible, comprehends an infinite number: I anſwer, That ſuch a Collection is impoſſible, and conſequently a meer nothing; becauſe all Men taken diſtributively, are indeed poſſible, but taken collectively are a meer impoſſible, and conſequently a meer nothing; becauſe God can never produce ſo great a number of Men, but he may always produce a greater, and agreater again; ſo that it is impoſſible that God may not always produce ſome Men; and conſequently the Collection of all Men poſſible is impoſſible, and a meer nothing.

If it be farther objected, That there are as many Men poſſible, as God knows are poſſible; and that God knows a number

infinite of poſſible; ſeeing that if he ſhould know onely a finite number of Men, he ſhould ſee the laſt Man poſſible, and ſhould know he could not create any more, and ſhould ſee the end of his Power, and conſequently his Power ſhould be finite: I Anſwer, That the number of Men poſſible, that God knows, is not infinite, nor alſo finite definitely and determinedly: So that one may aſſign and determine a certain number, beyond which God knows no more; for there is never ſo great a number but God may ſee and know a greater, and always a greater, and ſtill a greater, but notwithſtanding always finite; becauſe God knows things no otherwiſe than they are in themſelves: And therefore ſeeing that Men poſſible are in number finite indefinitely; God alſo knows certainly, that the number of Men poſſible is finite indefinitely, and from thence it doth not follow, that the power of God is finite and limited in it ſelf, or that he ſees the end of his power, ſince he may always produce and create other Men, though always in a finite number; but at the moſt it may be ſaid to be finite, in reſpect to its objects, or its effects, which cannot be but finite; as the knowledge God hath of this World, though

infinite

infinite in it ſelf; becauſe it is not diſtinct from the Divinity, may be ſaid to be finite, in reſpect to its objects, to wit, the World that is finite.

And now I will conclude this Chapter, deſiring the Reader to take notice that when I have ſpoken of the Eternity of God, of his Immenſity, of his Power, and of his Knowledge, he muſt not imagine, nor conceive, that I put or ſuppoſe, divers things, or divers qualities in God; but he muſt believe with me, that there is one and the ſame thing, to wit, one and rhe ſame Divinity, to which divers names are given and attributed, according to the divers reſpects, to which it is conſidered. For the ſame Divinity, in as much as it contains all Ages, and correſponds to every one of them, and is infinitely before them, is called *Eternity*: Seeing that it is the receptacle of all Bodies, correſponds to every one of them, and is infinitely beyond all the Creatures of the World, is called *Immenſity*; as it gives being to every thing, and protects and preſerves them; is called *Omnipotency*; as it places and diſpoſes them together, according to the dignity of each of them, is called *Wiſdom*: as it beſtows all ſorts of good things upon the Creatures, is called

Goodneſs. And for as much it decrees, foreſees, and rules all the Events in the World, is called *Providence.* And thus muſt we ſpeak of all his other Attributes.

The Anſwer of *Julius Scaliger*, in his Exercitations againſt *Cardanus*, to *Algazel* his Argument, and which the Affrican maintained to be moſt ſound and ſolid, hath been ſufficiently refuted, when I have proved that an infinite is not greater than another; neither materially nor formally.

CHAP. V.

1. *The fourth Anſwer of Atheiſts, ſaying, that from all Eternity there was a Chaos.* 2. *That the Heavens and the Elements did not by degrees diſintangle and reſolve themſelves from all Eternity.* 3. *That they did not remain a finite time, to reſolve or clear themſelves.* 4. *That they did not remain an infinite time, to clear and reſolve themſelves.*

A Digreſſion wherein the two firſt Verſes of the firſt Chapter of *Geneſis* are explained, and is ſhewed that there is no mention made of a Chaos,

Chaos, and that they do not contain a propoſition of all thoſe things, God created in ſix days, and that Light was not the firſt Creature.

1. The fourth Anſwer of Atheiſts is, That the World hath not been from all Eternity in the ſtate it is now; but that from all Eternity there was a Chaos; that is to ſay, that the Heavens, the Stars, the Elements, and all other things, have been from all Eternity, pell-melled and confuſed together; and that having reſolved themſelves, they have framed and diſpoſed the World in the ſtate it is now; that it was the opinion of *Euripides*, and divers Ancient Philoſophers; as of *Diodorus* in the Firſt Book of his Hiſtory.

The Reply.

2. Againſt this Objection or Anſwer, I ſay that if the Chaos, that is to ſay, the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, pell-melled and confuſed together, had been from all Eternity, it would follow, that either by degrees they had reſolved themſelves from all Eternity, or that a time finite or infinite would have paſſed before they had reſolved themſelves: But they did not re-

ſolve themſelves by degrees from all Eternity, and a time finite or infinite did not paſs, before they did reſolve themſelves: Therefore they have not been confuſed from all Eternity, and conſequently the Chaos was not from all Eternity. The Minor or ſecond Propoſition, which is the onely one that may be queſtioned, is verified thus:

Firſt, That the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, pell-melled togethar, did not by degrees reſolve and ſeparate themſelves from all Eternity, appears; becauſe the ſeparation of corporal things, mixed together, is not made without the local motion of ſome of them: But nothing did move locally from all Eternity, as I have ſhewed in the firſt Chapter; where I have proved that time and motion have not been from all Eternity.

Secondly, Thoſe things which did by degrees ſeparate themſelves from others, from all Eternity by local motion, they have remained, either a finite time, to ſeparate themſelves, or an infinite time; if a finite time, it will follow, that betwixt the mixture, and the perfect ſeparation, the difference and interval will be but a finite and limited time; and conſequently that betwixt

that

that which is from all Eternity; to wit, the mixture and that which is not from all Eternity, to wit, the perfect ſeparation, the difference will be but a finite and limited time, which is impoſſible. And moreover, It would follow that a finite time, ſuch as the duration of thoſe things, ſince their perfect ſeparation, added to a finite, ſuch as is the time that paſſed in their ſeparation, would make up an infinite time, ſuch as is the pretended Eternity of the mixture; all which is againſt this true Maxime, that one finite added to another finite, does not make up an infinite.

If they have remained an infinite time to ſeparate themſelves, it will follow that they will have run, through an infinite ſpace in their ſeparation; ſeeing that a finite ſpace may be run through in a finite time: and truly, ſince time is the meaſure or duration of motion, it will follow, that if time be infinite, the motion will be alſo infinite; and if the motion is infinite, the place or ſpace wherein things did move, will be infinite, either really or equivalently. But they have not run through an infinite ſpace, either really or equivalently; elſe they would have run through a ſpace, an hundred thouſand millions of thouſands of

times, and a ſpace a thouſand millions of times greater than this World, really or equivalently; which is abſurd. And beſides, It would follow that an infinite, would be greater than another; ſeeing the ſpace that they would have run through, until their perfect ſeparation, and that which they would have run through ſince their perfect ſeparation, ſhould be greater than the ſole ſpace, they ſhould have run through until their ſeparation: For a farther confirmation, look back upon the firſt Chapter, wherein I have proved that time and motion cannot be infinite.

3. Secondly, That the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have not remained a finite time, before they have reſolved and ſeparated themſelves; appears, becauſe it would follow, that betwixt the mixture, and the beginning of their ſeparation, the difference would be but of a finite time; and conſequently that betwixt that which is from all Eternity, as their pretended mixture; and that which is not from all Eternity, as their ſeparation, or the beginning thereof, the difference would be but of ſome limited time; and there would be wanting but a finite and limited time, leſt that their ſeparation, which had a

Beginning,

Beginning, ſhould be Eternal; and that one finite added to the other finite, ſhould make up an infinite, which is impoſſible.

4. Thirdly, That the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have not remained an infinite time before they have reſolved and ſeparated themſelves, appears, becauſe it is a Maxime received of all, that *Idem qua Idem, ſemper facit Idem*, at leaſt when 'tis not a free and intellectual Agent. Therefore, If the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have been confuſed and pell-melled together, during an infinite time, or during Eternity; how came it to paſs that they have reſolved and diſintricated themſelves at laſt? certainly it cannot be of themſelves, having remained in the ſame caſe and condition, above an hundred thouſand millions of thouſands of years; and if another has thus ſeparated them (as it is moſt true) it cannot be ought elſe but God.

5. It will not be out of purpoſe to add to this Reply, The true ſenſe of the two firſt verſes of the firſt Chapter of *Geneſis*, which are conceived in theſe words: *In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth; and the Earth was without form and void, and darkneſs*

neſs was upon the face of the Deep; and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters.

Becauſe, out of theſe words ſome Chriſtians have imagined a Chaos, ſaying, That God created firſt a Chaos, that is to ſay, the Heavens and the Elements mixed confuſedly together; and afterwards in ſix days did draw all Creatures out of the ſame; and others in greater number, ſay, that in the two alleadged verſes, *Moſes* makes a general Propoſition of all things created, in theſe two words, *Heaven* and *Earth*; and that in the following verſes, he ſpecifies the Creatures as God created them every day.

Againſt that I ſay, That the true ſenſe of the words of *Moſes*, is, that in the beginning of the firſt Day, which was the beginning of the firſt Evening, and the beginning of Time, God created the Imperial Heaven, which ſhould be the Manſion and Dwelling Place of God and the Bleſſed; the Earth which ſhould be the reſidence of Men during this momentary life, and the Waters which did then cover the whole face of the Earth. The chief reaſons of my Aſſertions are theſe:

Firſt, It is certain that the firſt day of

of the Creation, as well as the five others, is divided in Evening and Morning, and that the Evening is put before the Morning: For *Moſes* ſaith, *And the Evening and the Morning were the firſt Day*; and from thence it is that the Jews ever began their Natural Day, with the Evening. From which Conſideration I frame theſe two Arguments:

That which is part of the part, is alſo part of the whole: For Example, The Finger which it part of the Hand, is alſo part of the Arm, and of the whole Body; but the Evening is part of the Day, which is alſo part of Time: Therefore the Evening is alſo part of Time; and ſo when the Evening was, Time was alſo, or began to be. From this Argument I frame another thus: Time never was without ſome Corporal Creatures; ſeeing that Time is the duration of Corporal Things, or of their Motion; but in the Evening of the firſt Day, Time was or began to be; for the Evening, being part of the Natural Day, is alſo part of Time: Therefore in the Evening of the firſt Day, there were ſome Corporal Creatures: Now what other Corporal Creatures were in the Evening of the firſt Day, but the Heaven,

Heaven, the Earth, and the Waters, whereof mention is made in these two first verses of the first Chapter of *Genesis*. Wherefore it appears evidently that in these words, *In the Beginning God Created the Heaven and the Earth*; these two words (*in the Beginning*) are to be explained thus: In the beginning of Time, in the beginning of the first Day, in the beginning of the Evening of the first Day, God Created the Heaven and the Earth.

Secondly, After that *Moses* hath said, *In the beginning God Created Heaven and Earth*; he adds immediately, *and the Earth was without form and void*, that is to say, the Earth that God created with the Heavens, was then without an external form or appearance of Earth, because then it was all covered with Water, and was void of the Ornaments, which now inrich and adorn it; for then the Earth had neither Flowers nor Fruits, nor Herbs, nor Corn, nor Trees, nor Living Creatures, *&c.* Now when was it that the Earth was covered with Water, without appearance of Earth, without Beauty, and without Ornaments, but onely during the two first Days, unto the third exclusively; in which God separated the Waters from the Earth,

and

and beautified it with all ſorts of Plants.

Thirdly, I ſay that in all the Hiſtory of the Creation, deſcribed by *Moſes*, no mention at all is made of the Creation of the Imperial Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Waters, but in the two firſt verſes alleadged. For though the Firmament, which was Created the ſecond Day, be called *Heaven*, *v.* 8. yet it muſt not be underſtood of the Imperial Heaven, which is the Throne of God, and the Dwelling place of the Bleſſed; becauſe it is ſaid of this Firmament, *v.* 7. *That God divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the Waters which were above the Firmament*; that is to ſay, this Firmament divides the Earthly and the Heavenly Waters; and at verſe the 14. that in this Firmament God placed the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars; and at v. 20. that Fowls were appointed to flie towards it; all which cannot be underſtood of the Imperial Heaven, which is above all other Corporal Creatures, but onely of the Element of the Air.

Moreover, Though in the work of the third day, mention is made of the Separation of the Earth, and of the Sea; yet there is no mention made of their Creation; an evident proof that they had

had been Created before. And indeed *Moſes* deſcribing the work of the ſecond Day, ſpeaks in this manner: *And God ſaid, Let there be a Firmament in the midſt of the Waters, and let divide the Waters from the Waters: and God made the Firmament, and divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the Waters which were above the Firmament.* Now how would God have divided the Waters, if they had not been before? and how would he have created a Firmament between the Waters, if there had been no Water before? Therefore let us conclude that in theſe two firſt verſes, and no where elſe, mention is made of the Creation of the Imperial Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Water, that God made before the Light, whereof it is ſpoken in the third verſe.

Fourthly, Immediately after theſe words, *In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth, and the Earth was without form and void*; it is added, *And Darkneſs was upon the face of the Deep*; as if he ſhould have ſaid, when God created the Heaven and the Earth, and the Earth was covered with Water, without Beauty or Ornaments; then the vaſt and ſpacious Waters,

or

or the ſpaces between Heaven and Earth, were covered with Darkneſs, becauſe there was yet no Light, as appears by the Text; and God had not yet created that great body of Light, which he created afterwards; to wit, in the Morning of the ſame firſt Day; and whereof probably, in the fourth Day he made the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars, which may be very well thought to be the Element of Fire, ſeeing it hath all the effects and properties of it; and that in the whole Hiſtory of the Creation, mention is made no where elſe of the Element of Fire; but when God ſaid, *Let there be Light.* Moreover, It is certain that Darkneſs is nothing elſe but the privation of Light: now privation differs from a meer negation; in that privation ſuppoſes a ſubject capable to receive that whereof it is privation; and a meer negation ſuppoſes none: For Example, Blindneſs is the privation of Sight, which ſuppoſes a Creature capable to receive Sight, Death is a privation of Life, that ſuppoſes a Body ſuſceptible of Life, *&c.* Now ſeeing that Darkneſs which was before Light, as appears by the Text, is nothing elſe but a privation of Light, it is evident that Darkneſs ſuppoſes ſome Bodies ſuſceptible of Light, which

as

as well as Darkneſs have been before the Light; but theſe Bodies can be no others, but thoſe mentioned in the two firſt verſes, to wit, the Heaven, the Earth, and the Waters, which were created the Evening of the firſt Day.

But I ſuppoſe it will be objected, that the form ought always to be before the privation: For Example, The Sight before Blindneſs, Life before Death; and that conſequently the Light was before Darkneſs: But I anſwer, firſt, That all Philoſophers agree, that all Phyſical Privations, are before the Forms, whereof they are privations; becauſe they are privations of future forms, as logical privations, are privations of forms paſt. And thus the ſeminal matter hath the privation of the Soul, before it hath the Soul it ſelf; and every phyſical matter hath the privation of the eſſential form, before it hath ſuch a form; and in the Example alleadged above, it may happen that Blindneſs is before the Sight, Deafneſs before Hearing, and the privation of Life before Life. So the Born Blind and Deaf Man that Jeſus Chriſt healed, were Blind and Deaf, before they received either Sight or Hearing. And the *Embryo*, that is to ſay, the Infant in the Mothers Womb, before it

hath got perfect ſhape, hath the privation of rational Life, before ever he receives the ſaid rational Life.

Secondly, It is muſt true, that when a Subject is equally ſuſceptible of the Form and the privation of it, if the Agent may produce the Subject and the Form, it is then in the power of the Agent, if it be a free Agent, to produce the Subject with the Form, or with the Privation thereof: But the Earth, and the Waters are Bodies equally ſuſceptible of Light and Darkneſs: Therefore God who is a moſt free Agent, and who hath created the Earth, the Waters, and the Light, may have produced the Earth, and the Waters, with, or without Light. So then ſeeing that by the Text it appears, that Darkneſs was before Light, we muſt conclude, that the Earth and the Waters were produced tenebrous. Finally, It is moſt true, that the Light God created, is a moſt bright and ſhining Body, and not an accident, as I might make it appear, were not the Digreſſion too long already. Now who ſeeth not, that God may have created the Earth, and the Waters before this bright and ſhining Body, ſeeing he can create one Body before another.

By the conſideration of theſe things,

it is clear, that in the two alleadged verſes, *Moſes* doth not ſet down a general Propoſition, of all thoſe things God was to create afterwards; but that he deſcribes particularly, the creation of Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Waters, which were produced the Evening of the firſt Day. Moreover, It is evident, that in the ſaid verſes, *Moſes* ſpeaks not one word of a Chaos, containing all Creatures, pell-melled and confuſed together; ſeeing there is no mention made of the Firmament, nor of the Element of Fire, nor of the Stars, nor Plants, nor Living Creatures, but onely of the Imperial Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Waters; and yet there is never a word of the Heaven and the Earth being mixed together; and in the whole Hiſtory of the Creation, there is no mention made of the ſeparation of Heaven from the Earth, as there is of the ſeparation of the Earth, from the Waters that covered it. But enough of this matter, it is time to come to the Confutation of other Objections and Anſwers of Atheiſts.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

1. *The Fifth Anſwer of Atheiſts, ſaying, That there has been from all Eternity a Matter without Form.* 2. *The proof that there hath not been from all Eternity a Matter without Form, and that the Matter could not produce the Forms.* 3. *That the Eternal Atomes, by a caſual concourſe, have not made and diſpoſed the World.* 4. *That the Forms cannot have been produced but by God.*

1. THe Fifth Anſwer of Atheiſts is, That indeed the World has not been from all Eternity in the caſe and ſtate it is now; and that from all Eternity there hath been no Chaos, but that there hath been from all Eternity a Matter without Form, and that afterwards out of this Matter, all Forms have been produced, which being joyned with the Matter, have framed all Corporal Creatures, and made the World in the caſe and ſtate it is now. The Epicures following the Opinion of their Maſters *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, have ſpecified and determined what that

Matter was, to wit, the Atomes, which in time by a casual and accidental concourse have made up the World in the state it is now.

The Reply.

2. Against this Answer, I say, That if there had been from all Eternity a Matter without Form, it would follow, that the pretended Forms of Heaven, the Stars, and the Elements, as well as the Forms of Plants and Living Creatures, should have been after the Matter, and consequently would have had a beginning; and having not had beginning of themselves, seeing that nothing produces it self; they would have been necessarily produced in time by another, and that other would be necessarily, either the the Matter or some other thing, differing from the Matter. Now these Forms cannot have been produced in time, neithet by the Matter nor by any other thing differing from the Matter, unless it be by God himself; which I prove thus:

If any Eternal Matter had produced these Forms in time, it would follow necessarily, that before the production of the same, a time either finite or infinite, should have passed: not a finite time,

time, becauſe betwixt that which is from all Eternity, as the Matter (is ſuppoſed by them to be) and that which is not from all Eternity, as theſe Forms or the Productions of the ſame, the difference is greater than of a finite time And Moreover, It wonld follow, that a finite time, ſuch as that which ſhould have paſſed ſince the productions of theſe Forms, added to a finite time, ſuch as that which ſhould have paſſed before the production of theſe Forms, would make up an infinite time, or an infinite duration, ſuch as the Eternity of the Matter would be; which is impoſſible. Neither did an infinite time paſs before the production of theſe Forms; for how ſhould it come to paſs, that the Matter having been an infinite time all alone without acting, would produce them afterwards? Is it not a conſtant and true Maxime, that, *Idem qua Idem ſemper facit Idem*; when it is not a free and intellectual Agent, when there is no impedement, and the ſubjects which it works about are not different. Now Matter being not a free and intellectual Agent, and finding no impediment nor different ſubjects, ſeeing it is ſuppoſed to be all alone, before the productions of theſe Forms; it follows

neceſſarily it hath always done the ſame thing; and conſequently that it hath not remained a time, either finite or infinite to produce theſe Forms, if it may have produced them. Moreover, All Men know that *Cauſa naturalis agit a dextremum ſuæ potentiæ*; that is to ſay, Natural Cauſes act and work as much as they can: For Example, The Sun ſhines as much as it can, the Fire heats with all its ſtrength; and 'tis moſt true, that, *Cauſa neceſſaria, poſitis omnibus requiſitis ad agendum, & ſublatis impedimentis, neceſſario agit.* That is to ſay, Neceſſary Cauſes, all things required, granted, and having no impediments, act and work neceſſarily, and cannot keep back, nor ſuſpend their action. Now then, ſeeing that Matter is a Natural and not a Voluntary Cauſe, a neceſſary and not a free Cauſe, and that there is no impediment, being ſuppoſed all alone; it follows that if it may have produced theſe Forms, it muſt neceſſarily have produced them before (or without remaining) an infinite time.

3. Againſt the Epicures, teaching that the Eternal Atomes by a caſual concourſe, have made and diſpoſed the World, in the ſame caſe and ſtate it is at preſent; I ſay that this concourſe of Atomes, to frame and faſhion the World, cannot

cannot have happened without the local motion of ſome of them: From whence I argue thus, If the Atomes or the parts of the Matter had concurred, and conſequently had moved themſelves locally to frame and faſhion the World in the caſe and ſtate it is at preſent, it would follow that they would have moved themſelves locally from all Eternity, or that they would have remained, either a finite or an infinite time without moving, and then afterwards would have framed and faſhioned the World in the caſe and ſtate it is at preſent: but they have not moved themſelves locally from all Eternity, neither have they remained a finite or an infinite time without moving; as I have ſufficiently proved in the precedent Chapter, *Num.* 2, 3, 4. for the ſame things I have ſaid there of the Heaven and the Elements, may be ſaid likewiſe of the Atomes.

4. Finally, That theſe Forms have not been produced by any thing differing from the Matters, but by God himſelf, appears; becauſe the Agent who ſhould have produced them, would have been Eternal or not: if not Eternal he would have had a Beginning, and conſequently, would have been produced of another; of whom I would ask, Whether he be E-

ternal or not, and ſo always inquire, until one ſhould come to ſuch an Agent, as would not have been produced by another, and conſequently would be Eternal. If Eternal, he ſhould be either a neceſſary and natural Agent, or a free and voluntary Agent: If a natural and neceſſary Agent, he would have forthwith produced theſe Forms; for a natural and neceſſary Agent, acts, and works, as much as it can, and cannot ſuſpend his action; and conſequently theſe Forms would have been from all Eternity, and conſequently the World in the caſe and ſtate it is at preſent; which I have demonſtrated already to be altogether impoſſible: And if a free and intellectual Agent, it can be no other but God; ſeeing that by the word *GOD*, we mean and conceive nothing elſe, but a free and intellectual Agent, who hath produced the world, in the ſtate and caſe it is at preſent.

CHAP. VII.

1 *The Sixth Anſwer of Atheiſts, ſaying, That men have their Original and Beginning from the* Tritons *and* Sirens, *commonly called* Mairmaids. 2. *The Confutation of this Anſwer.*

1. The

1. THe Sixth Anſwer of Atheiſts is, That though men had not been from all Eternity, it would not follow, that they had been produced by ſome Divine and Superiour Cauſe; for one might ſay, That their Original is from ſome *Tritons* and *Sirens*, who after the Univerſal Floods, lived both in the Waters, and on the Land, and ſo in time became terreſtrial. And they ſay, that ſome Hiſtoriographers relate ſeveral things, which ſeem to juſtifie their allegation. *Herodotus* in the Fourth Book of his Hiſtory relates that *Jaſon* being carried away by a ſtorm into *Libia*, in the Countrey of the *Lotophages*, in the dangerous places of the *Tritonide* Fenns and Marſhes, there appeared to him a *Triton*, who demanded of him a Trevet, promiſing to reward him, with the diſcovery of the means, whereby he might come out of that place; which being performed by *Jaſon*, the *Triton* ſhewed him the way, and ſaved him. *Lewis Guicharden* writes, that in the year 1403 they brought to *Harlem* in *Holland*, a *Siren*, commonly called a *Mair maid*, which by degrees learned to eat bread, milk and other meat, to ſpin, and to make the Sign of the Croſs. *Acoſta* in the Third Book, Chapter the 18th of his Relations, deſcribes

deſcribes the *Uros* as a kind of men living in the waters, and obſerves that they themſelves ſaid they were no men. *Nicolo Conti* in *Ramnuſio*, relates, That in the River of *Cochin*, there are Fiſhes to be found with a humane Form and Reſemblance, that being taken, the difference of Sex is to be ſeen both in Male and Female, altogether like ours; and further he ſaith, that they are ſo induſtrious, as to come out of the water at night, to ſtrike fire with flints they find there, to make a fire with wood, at the light whereof they catch all other fiſhes that come near them.

The Reply.

2. Againſt this Anſwer, I ſay, Firſt, That there is no Author, let him be never ſo fabulous, that ever dreamed or writ, that men have their Original from the *Tritons* and *Sirens*. And Beſides, my reaſon reſpecting all terreſtrial Creatures, it would follow that Elephants, Lions, Bears, Oxen, and other terreſtrial Creatures, would have had their Original from the like Marine Creatures.

Secondly, It is a Moral Maxime, That every thing ſeeks and endeavours to better its Condition: Now either it is better for

for wateriſh Creatures, to become terreſtrial, or not: If it be better for them? how came it to paſs that they do not ſeek after it? And if it be not better for them, why have they done it in time paſt.

Finally, If they are become terreſtrial in times paſt, why do they not do the ſame now? And if ſuch a thing has happened heretofore, ſome where, why does it not come to paſs again, either there or in ſeme other place of the World?

Thirdly, Hiſtories make mention but of three Floods onely, to wit, that of *Noah*, that of *Ogyges*, and that of *Deucalion*; now theſe two laſt have not been univerſal, for they happened onely in one part of *Greece*; ſo that it was an eaſie thing to furniſh it again, with neighbouring People. And as for the firſt, it cannot be believed, except one believes a Divinity, whether we reſpect the Miracles that went along with it, or the Holy Man that writ the Hiſtory of it; who ſaith poſitively that God ſent it, and commanded *Noah* to build the *Ark*, to ſave in it all kinds of Terreſtrial Creatures; ſo that it is needleſs to have recourſe to Wateriſh Creatures

Fourthly, The Examples of *Herodotus*, *Guicharden*,

Guicharden, and others, prove indeed that there are *Tritons* and *Sirens*, but they ſpeak never a word, concerning Men having had their original from them. And as for the ſtrange things they write of them, it is certain they had them by hear-ſay from others, who might have been deceived in the Narration, and by the Declarer, as well as themſelves. And this will ſoon appear to be true, if we judge impartially of the Writings of *Herodotus*; for moſt part of what he writes from others, is ſo far from being a true Hiſtory, that it ſavours the Romance altogether: As when he ſaith in his Second Book, That *Rampſinitus* King of *Egypt*, went down into Hell, and there played at Dice with *Ceres*; That the Sun did riſe twice in the Weſt, and did ſit twice in the Eaſt: That *Sennacherib* King of *Aſſiria* and *Araba*, being in his March towards *Egypt* to War againſt *Setho* King of that Country, his Bows and Quivers were gnawed by Cats, ſo that he was fain to go back again into his own Country with ſhame. That the Daughter of *Cheopes* King of *Egypt*, did proſtitute her ſelf to every Man that would give her but a Stone, whereof was made one of the *Pyramides*, which made one of the ſeven Wonders

Wonders of the World. That *Phero* became blind for having ſhot an Arrow in the River *Nilus*; and ten years after recovered his ſight by waſhing his Eyes with the Urine of a Woman, that never lay with any Man but her Husband: And truly *Diodorus* in the Fourth Book of his Hiſtory, obſerves, That *Triton* who ſhewed *Jaſon* and the other Argonauts, the way to avoid the Quick-ſands of the Sea, was a King of *Lybia* and not a Fiſh. *Acoſta* ſpeaking of the *Uros*, does not affirm that they are Wateriſh Creatures, but onely a rude and unpoliſhed People. Theſe are are his very words, *Theſe*, Uros (ſaith he) *are ſo rude and blockiſh a People, that they do not repute themſelves to be Men.* And as for the Fiſhes of the River of *Cochin* whereof *Nicolo Conti* ſpeaks, I ſay that in matter of Narrations and Hiſtories, we ought not to believe whatſoever every one relates, who for to humour himſelf, writes the Imaginations of his own Brain, or the Stories of others that deceived him; but we muſt believe onely, that which is related to us by ſuch Men as have travelled in thoſe Countreys. Now many Hollanders, and Portugals, that have been at *Cochin*; and have ſeen the River

and

and the Fiſhes in it, make no mention of ſuch Fiſhes, and hold it as a Lie and a Fable, whatſoever *Nicolo Conti* writes of this matter.

Finally, If whatſoever is written concerning the Tritons, ſhould be true, and that Men ſhould be originary of the pretended Eternal Tritons; yet my Reaſon would remain whole and entire; and my Arguments againſt the Eternity of Men, may be applied to the Tritons: And I may argue thus again, If the Tritons have been from all Eternity, the number of theſe Tritons which have been in time paſt is infinite: That the Tritons which are pretended to have Lived from all Eternity, yet have not Lived an Eternity, but onely a certain limited time: And that the Tritons which have been in time paſt unto this very day, are all diſtant with a finite diſtant of time, or all with an infinite diſtance, or ſome with a finite, and others with an infinite diſtance: And ſo applying to the Tritons what I have ſaid of Men in the Firſt Chapter, it will clearly appear that the ſame abſurdities do follow.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

1. *The Seventh Answer of Atheists, saying, That Men have been produced by, or proceeded from the Eternal Earth, or from all the Elements together.* 2. *Reasons alleadged, or Evidence produced against the Falshood of this Answer.* 3. *That the Earth, nor the other Elements cannot have been naturally disposed to produce Men.* 4. *Other Reasons proving that Men have not been produced by the Earth, nor by the other Elements.*

1. THe Seventh Reason of Atheists is, That Men have been produced by, or proceeded from the Eternal Earth, or from all the Elements together, which have been Eternal, and in time have produced the first Men, by which all others have had their original by way of Generation; in a manner as Rats, Frogs, Flies, and other Creatures of this kind are formed at this time, out of a Terrestrial Matter.

The

The Reply.

2. Againſt this Anſwer, I ſay, That if the Eternal Earth had produced in time, the firſt Men, or if the Sun, or any other Eternal Agent, had produced them out of the Eternal Earth; it would follow that the Eternal Earth would have remained, either a finite or an infinite time, before their production; but neither can be ſaid without abſurdity: not a finite time, elſe it would follow that betwixt the Earth and the Production of the firſt Men, the difference would be onely of a finite and limited time; and conſequently that betwixt that which is from all Eternity, as the Earth, and that which is not from all Eternity, as the Production of the firſt Men, the difference would be only of a finite and limited time, which is impoſſible. And beſides, it would follow, That a finite time, ſuch as ſhould be that which ſhould have paſſed, ſince the the Production of the firſt Men unto this day, added to a finite time, ſuch as ſhould be that which ſhould have paſſed ſince the exiſtence of the Earth, unto the Production of the firſt Men, would make up an infinite time, ſuch as is the

the pretended Eternity of the Earth: all which is againſt this true Maxime: That a finite added to another finite, doth not make up an infinite. And further, That there would be wanting but a finite and limited time; leſt that the production of the firſt Men, which hath had a Beginning ſhould be Eternal, to wit, that finite and limited time that would have paſſed, ſince the exiſting of the Earth, unto their production. Not an infinite time alſo, elſe it would follow, that the Earth would have remained above an hundred thouſand times, a hundred millions of years, without having produced Men; and that after an infiniteneſs of years, it would have produced them; which is abſurd: becauſe natural and neceſſary cauſes, ſuch as the Earth is, all things remaining in the ſame ſtate, do act always the ſame thing. Now what I ſay concerning the Earth, may be ſaid of all Elements together.

3. And it is to no purpoſe, to ſay, That after an infiniteneſs of time, the Eternal Earth is (as it were) become apt, and diſpoſed to produce Men; and ſo conſequently hath produced them; but before was not diſpoſed, and conſequently could not produce them. For againſt

that I ſay, That ſuch an aptneſs or diſpoſition of the Earth, muſt needs have come to paſs, either by degrees, from all Eternity; ſo that after an infiniteneſs of time, it hath been perfected and accompliſhed; or that after an infiniteneſs of time, it is come to paſs, either all at once, or ſucceſſively: now neither of theſe can be ſaid without abſurdity. Not that it is come to paſs by degrees, from all Eternity, elſe that diſpoſition or alteration of the Earth, would have had parts ſucceeding one another, from all Eternity; and ſo ſucceſſion, motion, and time, would have been from all Eternity: which I have ſhewed above to be altogether impoſſible. Not alſo that after an infiniteneſs of time, it is come to paſs, either all at once, or ſucceſſively; for if it were ſo, it would have been the act and work, either of the Earth it ſelf, or of another natural and neceſſary cauſe, ſuch as are the other Elements; or of a free and intellectual Agent. Not of the Earth, or of any other natural and neceſſary cauſe; becauſe natural and neceſſary cauſes, all things remaining in the ſame ſtate, act and work always the ſame things, and act as much as they can, without having power to ſuſpend their

action,

action; and conſequently would not have remained more than an hundred thouſand times an hundred thouſand millions of years, to produce this aptneſs and diſpoſition, much leſs an infiniteneſs of time. If this Diſpoſition hath been produced by a free and intellectual Agent, it cannot be but by the Creator of the Univerſe, who is the great and glorious God whom we adore.

4. Now add to what hath been ſaid, this true Maxime of Philoſophers, *Natura progreditur ab imperfectionibus ad perfectiora.* Nature proceeds from things more imperfect, to the more perfect: That is to ſay, Natural cauſes in their operations, produce firſt imperfect things, which afterwards become more perfect in time: So the Earth breeds firſt Shrubs, which in time become great Trees; and produces Frogs, and Worms, and Flies, and other ſmall and weak inſects, which in time become great and ſtrong. Therefore, If the firſt Men have been produced by the Earth, or the other Elements, they cannot have been produced but very little and moſt weak, as they that are newly born, and do but come out of the Mothers Womb; in which caſe Men would have been almoſt Dead as ſoon as

Born, there being no ſuccour nor help for them, and ſo there would be never a Man left at this time. For it were to overthrow the order of Nature, to imagine that the Earth, or the other Elements, ſhould have produced the firſt Men, as perfect as they are at this time, at Five and twenty, or thirty years of Age. And beſides, Our Reaſon extends it ſelf to all ſorts of Animals, as well Terreſtrial, as them that live in the Waters; ſo that it would neceſſarily follow, that the Earth, the Air, the Water, and the Fire, or all the Elements together, ſhould have produced, not onely the firſt Men, but alſo the firſt Lions, the firſt Elephants, the firſt Whales, the firſt Dolphins, and the like, in their perfection, Male and Female, for the propagation of the ſame; which is altogether againſt the Order of Nature.

Moreover, If the Earth, or the other Elements, have heretofore produced ſome Men, why do not they produce no more at this time? and if they have produced Lions, Whales, and other Animals, how comes it to paſs that they produce none at this time, in ſome parts of the World? Surely, Mens Wits muſt be ſtrangely perverted and overturned, to ſuppoſe ſuch Extravagances and Dreams.

Dreams. Therefore ſince for the propagation of the humane kind, the firſt Men muſt neceſſarily have been in a perfect Age and State, and that Nature could not make them ſuch; one muſt believe that as it is related by *Moſes* in the Book of *Geneſis*, to wit, that there is a God, who out of the Earth, mixed with the other Elements, hath framed end faſhioned a perfect humane Body, and having breathed in his Noſtrils the breath of Life, he became a living Soul. Finally, It is an undoubted Truth, That none can give that which he hath not: Therefore, Seeing that the Earth, and the other Elements, diſtitute of underſtanding, and much more imperfect than Men, neither contain, nor enjoy, either formally, or in eminency and vertue the excellent perfections of the reaſonable Soul; it is evident they cannot produce it, nor conſequently Man, whoſe chiefeſt and nobleſt part is the reaſonable Soul.

CHAP. IX.

1. The Eighth Answer of Atheists, saying, That there have been many Worlds, which have been produced the one by the other, and not by a Superior Spirit. 2. The Confutation of this Answer.

1. THe Eighth Answer of Atheists is, That this World hath not been from all Eternity, and yet hath not been created by any Superior and Almighty Spirit; but that it hath been produced out of the Matter of another World, which was before, and that that other hath been produced out of the Matter of another, which was also before it, and so there have been many Worlds which have succeeded one another; the World that perished being the Matter of the Generations of the new produced World; and that this World which we see now, shall perish one day, and out of the Matter of it another shall be produced, and out of the Matter of that another shall be produced again, and so consequently.

The Reply.

2. Againſt this Anſwer, I ſay, That the Worlds which are pretended to have been in time paſt; are either finite or infinite in number; if finite in number, it follows that there hath been a firſt World, which was never produced out of the Matter of another World, elſe it would not have been firſt; nor out of any Chaos or Eternal Matter, as I have ſufficiently proved, in the Fifth and Sixth Chapters; and conſequently the firſt World muſt needs have been created by a Superior and Almighty Spirit, who is the great God whom we adore. If infinite in number, the ſame abſurdities which follow the infiniteneſs of Men, which we have ſhewed heretofore, will alſo follow of the infiniteneſs of Worlds; for there is no greater number than an infinite number; elſe the leſs infinite nnmber would be exceeded by the greater, and conſequently ſhould be finite and termined, ſeeing that which is exceeded is termined where it is exceeded. Now there is a greater number than that of the Worlds, which are pretended to have been in time paſt; to wit, the number of Stars, the number of Plants, the number of Animals, or the number of all Things in particular, which

have been in all thoſe pretended Worlds. Therefore the number of thoſe Worlds (pretended to have been in time paſt) is not infinite. Moreover, All thoſe pretended Worlds were diſtant one from another, with a finite diſtance of time onely, or with an infinite diſtance onely, or ſome were diſtant with a finite diſtance, and others with an infinite diſtance: If they all have been diſtant with a finite diſtance of time onely; and ſince a finite diſtance of time cannot comprehend Eternity, or infiniteneſs; it follows neceſſarily, that they have not been from all Eternity, that they have been in a finite number, and that there hath been one firſt, which having not produced it ſelf, nor having been produced by a Chaos, or an Eternal Matter, as I have ſhewed above, it muſt have been created of God, neceſſarily. If they have been all diſtant, with an infinite diſtance of time onely, it follows that there hath been an infinite time, betwixt the two neareſt Worlds, as well as betwixt the two remoteſt, which is contradictory: And if ſome have been diſtant with a finite diſtance of time, and others with an infinite, and one takes the two remoteſt Worlds in the finite diſtance, it will follow that one

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onely World, to wit, the neareſt, beyond one of them two, being removed from them, but with a finite diſtance of time, will make up an infinite diſtance of time, and that one finite added to another finite, will make up an infinite; which is abſurd.

I might uſe ſeveral other Arguments to refute this Anſwer of Atheiſts, were it not that it is ſufficiently confuted in the firſt and ſecond Chapters; where I have ſhewed that Men have not been from all Eternity. I will add onely, That every thing follows its natural inclination, and that which is beſt for it: Now if the natural inclination of Bodies, is to make a World, and that it is beſt for them; the World having been made, cannot have been deſtroyed naturally; and the Bodies did never reduce, nor reſolve themſelves into a Chaos: but if their inclination, and the beſt for them, is, not to make a World, and to remain in a Chaos; it is evident that the World cannot have been produced naturally, and that the Bodies would have remained always ſeparate or in confuſion. And beſides, I have ſufficiently demonſtrated already, that no ſucceſſion is Eternal, and conſequently that of the pretended Worlds and Chaos cannot be Eternal. CHAP.

CHAP. X.

1. *The Ninth Answer of Atheists, saying, That Christians confess that the World may have been from all Eternity.* 2. *Their Reasons to prove that the World may have been from all Eternity.* 3. *The Confutation of their Answer.* 4. *An Answer to the Reasons alleadged for the possibility of the Eternity of the World.*

1. THe Ninth and last Reason of Atheists, is, That Christians confess that God may have created the World from all Eternity, though they believe he hath created it but in time. Now (say they) it is a true *Axiom*, that *Posito possibili, nihil sequitur absurdi.* That is, If one lays or supposes actually a thing possible, there follows no absurdity. And therefore seeing that the World may have been from all Eternity, there is no inconvenience nor contradiction, to suppose it actually from all Eternity.

2. Their Reasons to prove that the World may have been from all Eternity are these. 1. *All things are possible to God,* *Matth.*

Matth. 10. Therefore the Eternity of the World is poſſible to him. 2. God hath never been without power to create the World, but God hath been from all Eternity; therefore he may have created the World from all Eternity. 3. One ought not to deprive God of any of the perfections, which belong to the Creature; when this perfection is not accompanied of any imperfection, as is the power of Acting. Now if the Creature, for Example, the Sun, were from all Eternity, it would act and work from all Eternity, in Lightening and ſending forth its Beams: Therefore God having been from all Eternity, hath acted, or may have acted from all Eternity, and conſequently hath created, or may have created the World from all Eternity. 4. That which is once impoſſible, cannot be made poſſible, but always remains impoſſible: For Example, It is impoſſible that a Man ſhould be a Beaſt; ſo it hath been and ever will be impoſſible for a Man to be a Beaſt.

Therefore, If the World hath been ſometimes impoſſible, to wit, from all Eternity, it follows that it never hath, nor never will be poſſible, and conſequently hath not been created. 5. If the World hath been impoſſible from all Eternity,

ternity, either it nath been impoſſible during a finite time or during an infinite time; if impoſſible during a finite time onely, it will follow that betwixt that which hath been from all Eternity, as the impoſſibility of the World, and that which is not from all Eternity, as the poſſibility of it; the difference will be but of a finite and limited time: and beſides it will follow that a finite time, ſuch as that as is paſt, ſince the poſſibility of the World, added to another finite time, ſuch as is the duration of its impoſſibility; will make up an infinite time, ſuch as is the Eternity of the ſame impoſſibility; which is contradictory. And if the World hath been impoſſible, during an infinite time, ſeeing that an infinite Time, and Eternity are one and the ſame thing, and have neither beginning nor end, it is evident that the World ſhall have been Eternally impoſſible, and never could be produced.

6. One muſt reaſon of the Fore-Eternity, as of the After-Eternity, ſeeing that of things alike the ſame judgment is to be made. But the World may be Eternal of the After-Eternity, ſeeing that God may preſerve, and cauſe it to be and exiſt Eternally: therefore it may have been Eternal of the Fore-Eternity, and conſequently

ſequently may have been from all Eternity. 7. God might create the World before the time he created it, and before again, and always before to the infinite: therefore he may have created it from all Eternity, for to go forward to the infinite, or to Eternity, is the ſame thing.

The Reply.

3. Againſt this Anſwer, I ſay, That very few Chriſtians ſay that the World may have been created from all Eternity, in the ſtate it is now, becauſe of the contradictions that would follow, the which (I hope) I have ſufficiently noted already: for the ſame contradictions and abſurdities, which follow from the exiſtence of the World, do alſo follow from its creation from all Eternity. Therefore when ſome Chriſtians by reaſon of a pious zeal, being willing to exalt the Omnipotency of God, have written, that God may have created the World from all Eternity; that is underſtood by the Learned of the World in another ſtate, to wit, in a ſtate of immobility. For Example, If God had created the Sun from all Eternity, it would have remained infinitely without motion;

motion; if God had created the Sea from all Eternity, it would have remained infinitely, without Flowing and Ebbing. If God had created Men from all Eternity, they would have remained from all Eternity, without Pulse, without Breath, and without Motion of the Animal and Vital Spirit; and without Dying; and if God had produced all other Creatures from all Eternity, they would have remained infinitely without Motion, and without being capable to be Destroyed; and during this infiniteness of time, God would not have had an obsolute Dominion and Sovereignty over them, seeing that during this infinite time he could not have destroyed them. But seeing such an Answer is repugnant to right Reason, and neither favours nor countenances Atheists; seeing it grants a Godhead, and supposes the World in another state than Atheists do; I will insist upon it no longer, but will come to the Answer of their Reasons alleadged in their Answer.

4. To their first Reason, Drawn from that excellent Truth, *That all Things are possible to God*: I Answer, That God may do all Things possible; but he cannot do those Things that are impossible and contridictory. For Example

ple, God cannot Die, nor Lie; becauſe to be God, and to be a Lier, or Mortal, are things contradictory. But the Eternity of the World is a thing impoſſible, and that involves and implies many abſurdities and contradictories; as I have ſhewed heretofore. I Anſwer again, That all Things are poſſible to God, but that the Eternity of the World is not a Thing, becauſe it is impoſſible, and that which is impoſſible is nothing, and conſequently may not be called a Thing.

To the Second Reaſon, to wit, That God hath never been without Power to create the World, and that having been from all Eternity, he may have created the World from all Eternity: I Anſwer, That God hath never been without Power to create the World, when it may have been created; but the World cannot have been created from all Eternity, but onely in time: Therefore God hath never been without Power to create the World in time, but he hath been from all Eternity, without having power to create the World from all Eternity. It is moſt true that God hath never been without his Omnipotency, and conſequently hath never been without the Power to create the World; but he could

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not exercise and execute from all Eternity, the Act of his Omnipotency, to wit, the Creation; but onely in time: Not that this proceeds from any Defect or any Impotency in God; but because the Creature cannot concurre and agree with Eternity, because of the contradictions that would follow, and which I have set down already in this Tract. And as the Soul of an Infant, which is still in the Mothers Womb, hath the power to reason, in that he hath the principle of ratiocination, that is the understanding, but cannot exercise the act of that power; to wit, ratiocination; but onely after his Birth and Childhood: not that such a thing proceeds from any defect in the Soul; but because the Organ, whereby ratiocination is exercised, is not yet disposed as it ought: So God hath had indeed from all Eternity the Power whereby he hath created the World, but he could not exercise from all Eternity the act of this Power; that is the Creation of the World: Not that it proceeds from any Defect in God, but because the World cannot be Eternal; as I have already sufficiently demonstrated.

To the Third Reason drawn from this Example, That if the Sun had been from

from all Eternity, it would have acted, that is Enlightened from all Eternity; and likewise that God being from all Eternity, hath acted, or may have acted from all Eternity, and consequently hath created or may have created the World from all Eternity. I Answer, That to suppose the Sun Eternal is to suppose a thing impossible. Now one must not wonder, if supposing a thing impossible, to wit, the Sun Eternal; one supposes another impossible also, *viz.* the Eternal illumination: For if one Creature be Eternal, the other must also be the same. But in supposing God Eternal, one supposes a thing, not onely possible, but which is so actually; and from thence they infer and conclude, without ground or reason, that he may create the World from all Eternity, seeing that Eternity of this World is impossible, as (I hope) I have sufficiently proved. Therefore as God, though he be infinite, cannot produce an infinite effect; and though he be immutable, cannot produce an immutable effect; so though God be Eternal, he cannot produce an Eternal effect: because Eternity as well as infinity and immutability, are attributes incommunicable to the Creature.

To the Fourth Reaſon, That if the World hath been ſometimes impoſſible, to wit, from all Eternity, it will have been always impoſſible; and conſequently will not have been created. I Anſwer, That in the ſame manner, it hath been impoſſible, it will always be impoſſible; now it hath been impoſſible from all Eternity: therefore it will be impoſſible to all Eternity. And as it is not abſolutely impoſſible, that Man ſhould be; but it is impoſſible that Man ſhould be a Beaſt: So it is not abſolutely impoſſible that the World ſhould be; but it is impoſſible that the World ſhould be Eternal: and as Man never was, nor never will be a Beaſt; ſo the World never was, nor never will be Eternal.

To the Fifth Reaſon, That if the World hath been impoſſible from all Eternity, it hath been impoſſible, during a finite time, or during an infinite time; which is abſurd, *&c.* I anſwer, That Time and the World are always neceſſarily together; ſeeing that Time is nothing elſe but the continuance of Corporal Things, whereof the VVorld is made, or the continuance of their Motion. And therefore, Since that Eternity is before Time, it is evident that, that which is from all Eternity,

ternity, is before whatsoever Time, be it finite or infinite. Now it is ridiculous to ask, whether that which hath been before Time, whilst it hath been before time, hath continued and lasted, a finite or infinite Time. Moreover, I Answer as before, *viz.* That the World hath not been absolutely impossible, seeing it hath been possible in time, but that it hath been impossible from all Eternity; and that this impossibility of the World from all Eternity, hath been; is, and shall be to all Eternity.

To the Sixth Reason, That the World may be Eternal of the After-Eternity, and consequently that it may have been Eternal of the Fore-Eternity, and so from all Eternity. I Answer, That Eternity being an attribute of the God-head, incommunicable to the Creature, is not different from the God-head: and therefore as the God-head is always the same, indivisible and without parts, though its immensity, which is not different from it, be without Limits, and cannot be measured, by any greatness; all Bodies being but a point of this Immensity; So Eternity hath been, is, and always shall be the same, indivisible and without parts; though it cannot be measured by Ages, which always will be no

more than a point of this Eternity. From whence it follows, That those Men, which divide it, in the Fore and After-Eternity, do not at all understand the nature of Eternity; seeing that these words, Before and After, belong onely to such things, as are subject to Time, Motion, and Succession, and whereof the Parts perish one after another; and not to Eternity, which is before Time, and without Parts, and whereof nothing can perish. Besides, There is a vast difference betwixt these two pretended Eternities, as I have amply demonstrated, in my Reply to their second Answer; chiefly in that the Fore-Eternity is all past; and that the After-Eternity shall never pass, nor end. And if one should suppose of the After-Eternity, that which is most true of the Fore-Eternity, to wit, that it is all past; it is evident it should be finite and limited on all sides, *viz.* By this Day, and by the last time of this Eternity, which should pass, and end. And if it be finite, it cannot be a true Eternity; for a true Eternity is an infinite continuance.

To the Seventh Reason, That God might create the World before the time he created it, and before again, and always before, to the infinite, and consequently

ſequently from all Eternity. I Anſwer, That though the World in its total, may have been created in leſs time; ſeeing that God who created it in ſix days, might have created it in one day, yea, in a moment. Nevertheleſs it is moſt true, That the World, if we have a regard to the firſt Creatures, which are the chiefeſt parts of the ſame, to wit, the Heavens and the Earth, could not be made ſooner than it hath been made, and could not be created, before the time it hath been created; becauſe before the time, that the World hath been created, there was no other continuance than Eternity: but the World cannot have been from all Eternity, as I have demonſtrated: Therefore the World cannot have been before the time it hath been created. And indeed theſe words of Before and After, Sooner and Later, cannot belong but to time, that hath Parts, whereof ſome are Sooner, ſome Later, ſome Before, and ſome After. But Eternity being indiviſible, and without Parts (as I have proved) can have neither Before nor After; and conſequently, though Eternity, may have been before the World and before Time, nevertheleſs there was in it neither Before nor After. Therefore one cannot

ſay, That the World may have been Before, and Before again, and always Before to the infinite: becauſe where there is a Before, and again another Before, and always a Before, to infinite, there are many Befores (if I may ſo ſpeak) whereof one is Before, and the other After; but in the Eternity before the World, and before Time, there have been neither Before nor After.

And if any one objects, That the Heaven and the Earth which have been the firſt Creatures, may have been created later; and conſequently may have been created ſooner: I Anſwer, That Heaven and Earth may be conſidered, either as Creatures, or as the firſt Creatures. If they be conſidered as Creatures, I ſay that they might have been created later, ſeeing that God, who created them the firſt day, might have created them the ſecond day, and ſome others the firſt day: But if they be conſidered as the firſt Creatures, I ſay they could not be created later; becauſe they could not be created later, but in creating them after ſome others. Now if they had been created after others, they ſhould not have been the firſt Creatures. Moreover, Though the Heaven,

Heaven and the Earth, which have been the first Creatures, might have been created later, in the manner aforesaid; yet it doth not follow that they may have been sooner than they have been: because that before the Time, or before the first Creatures, there have not been, nor could have been any continuance, but Eternity. Now the first Creatures, and so consequently the World, cannot have been from all Eternity, as I have sufficiently proved. Therefore the World, or the Creatures, cannot have been before the time they have been; and consequently cannot have been sooner than they have been.

Finally, According to the common Opinion, one might say, That though the World might have been created before, and before again; and always before to the infinite; yet it would not follow that the World might have been from all Eternity. For though a Body may be supposed greater than another, to the infinite, yet it does not follow, that there is a Body actually infinite; seeing that this progression to the infinite, doth not reach farther, than to an infinite in power (*i. e. Potentia*; as they speak in the School) which is

always actually finite: So though the World might have been before, and always before, to the infinite; it does not follow that the World may have been from all Eternity; seeing that this progression to the infinite, does not reach further than to an infinite in power, which is also actually finite, and comprehended, and included in the temporal continuance.

And now Courteous Reader, I shall end this Chapter, together with this long, but (I hope) solid Disputation, against the most prophane and ungrateful Men that ever were, I mean the Atheists, with this advice, That if ever thou chancest to dispute with them, to make use of the Reasons set down in this Chapter, especially the first in the Reply, as being the chief that proves demonstratively that there is a *GOD*; and so forcibly convinces Atheists, that they are not onely without Answer, but even without Evasion.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Other Reasons proving that there is a God.

1. The First Reason is drawn from the Order of the Universe. 2. The Second, From the general Consent of all People and Nations, who ever acknowledged a God-head. 3. The Third, From the fear of the Judgments of God, because of Sin. 4. The Fourth, From the existence of Devils. 5. The Fifth, Is drawn from the first Mover, and the first Cause. 6. The Sixth, From the Novelty of Histories. 7. And the Seventh, From the Consideration that the Sea hath not submerged the Earth.

First Reason.

THe First Reason that proves a God-head, Is drawn from the Disposition and admirable Order of the Universal World: thus, Order admits and presupposes Intelligence and Wisdom;

Wisdom; for Order being a convenient Disposition of Things, according to the dignity of each; that they may be conveniently disposed, they ought to be first compared among themselves, and one must know their Dignity, which is proper to Intelligence. And Secondly, They must be placed and disposed, according to their Rank and Dignity, which is proper to Wisdom. Therefore seeing that Order presupposes Intelligence and Wisdom; a most excellent and most perfect Order, presupposes a Sovereign and most perfect Intelligence and Wisdom; but the Order and Disposition of all the parts of the World, is most perfect and most excellent: Therefore there must needs be a most Sovereign Intelligence, and a most perfect Wisdom; that may have given this admirable Order and Disposition: Now this sovereign Intelligence, and this perfect Wisdom, we call Divinity.

Now that the Order and Disposition of the Universe is most perfect and most excellent, appears, if one takes a view of all the Parts thereof: In the Heavens you see the Stars of the Firmament twinkling and sparkling as so many petty Suns, and always keeping the same distance among themselves:

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The Sun that never goes beyond the Tropikes, and other Stars, having their Motion so excellently regulated, that they were never seen out of their ordinary course, but by a Miracle. Now from whence may come this uniformity of Motion, but from the first Mover; who always remaining firm and immoveable, moves all things according to his will? From whence comes it to pass, That the Motions of the Sun is so moderate, that it rules and directs all other Motions here below? Why does it rather move from East to West, rather than from the North to the South? And why, being come to a certain Point, it never goes any farther? but because there is a Sovereign Moderator of this Universe, who hath assigned to all Things Bounds and Limits, beyond which they cannot go? Descend from the Heavens to the Elements, and you shall see that though they be totally contrary one to the other, yet they all enter in the composition of all Bodies: and as sometimes a sweet Harmony is caused by different Sounds, so from the contrariety of the Elements, is made up that Temper and Proportion which is to be seen in all mixt Bodies. Now from whence may proceed this mutual

Agreement

Agreement of Countraries, whose property it is (if we believe Philosophers) to destroy one another, or expel one another; but from a superior Spirit, who hath made them subject to his Will? Consider the Earth in particular, you shall find it almost every where differing and unlike: Here it is Slimy and Muddy, in another sort Dry and Sandy; in some places it will breed Fruits onely, in another Vines and Corn; *Hic segetes illic veniunt felicius uvæ, Arborei fœtus alibi*, &c. In *Peru* there are Mines of Silver and Gold; in *Swedeland* Mines of Iron and Copper; in *Cornwall* are the Mines of Tynn; and in other Countries of other Minerals. *Egypt* and *Sicily* are fruitful in Corns; *Numidia* in Dates, *Tunis* in Olive-trees; the Island *Madera* in Sugar; and most part of the Countries in Europe in Wines. In *Arabia* are Flying Serpents; in *Egypt* Crocodiles, in *England* Coursing Horses, fierce Mastiffes, &c. In *Scotland* Tracing Dogs, in *Affrica* are Lions, in *Asia* Elephants; and in other Countries are sundry sorts of divers Animals. Now from whence comes this diversity and variety of Lands and Soils, but from him who created and produced them? Who gave to so many differing and unlike Creatures,

Creatures, thoſe Verrues and Properties which they have, but him, who communicated them unto them when he created and gave them their Beings?

Caſt your Eyes upon the Waters, and conſider the ſweet Fountains ſpringing out of the Salt Sea, the Springs and Sources of ſeveral Rivers bubbling out of the Tops of the higheſt Mountains, and yet proceed from the Sea, a great deal lower than they. The Rivers, *Nilus*, *Niger*, and *Paraguez*, which at their appointed time, never fail to overflow the Lands to farten them: Some Waters will preſently congeal and kill them that drink of them, and ſome others are Healthful, and will cure the moſt inveterate Maladies. There are ſome Springs Hot and Scalding Water; others whoſe Waters are turned into Flints: But above all other Things, admire that ſo well ordered Flowing and Ebbing of the Sea, whereof the certain cauſe is unknown to this very day; the great Whales and others Marine Monſters that are in it; and ſo many other Wonderful Things, that point out (as it were with the Finger) the infinite Power, and the Eternal Wiſdom of a Divinity.

Finally, Let us conſider our ſelves, and

and observe the Frame of our Bodies, so admirably ordered, that the best understanding Men do greatly wonder at it: Nay look upon the wonder of our Eyes and Ears, the Ability and Nimbleness of our Hands, the Dispensation of Spirits, for the Motions of our Members, and the Functions of our Senses, the Light of our Understanding, its Prompt and Nimble Actions, its Conduct and Guiding so excellent, its great Capacity to Reason of all Things: And after all that we will be worse than the Beasts of the Fields, and all Creeping Things upon the Earth, if we do not confess and acknowledge that there is a *GOD*, in whom we Live, and Move, and have our Being; and all these things, that the more clear sighted Fathers, must acknowledge, they can in no ways communicate to their Children.

The Second Reason.

The Second Reason, Which proves a Divinity, is drawn from the general Consent of all People and Nations of the Earth, who ever acknowledged a *Divinity*. For a *Tully* saith in the First Book of his *Laws*, *There is never a People so Rude and Barbarous but confesses*

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feſſes that a God muſt be ſaid (that is acknowledged) *Seneca* in 117. *Epiſtle* ſaith, *That there is no People ſo perverted but believes there are Gods:* And *Ariſtotle* in the Third Chapter of the Firſt Book of *Heaven*, writes; *That all Men one way or other acknowledge a Divinity.* Now ſeeing that as *Tully* ſaith, in the Firſt Book of his *Queſtion. Tuſc.*) *The Conſent of all People is to be eſteemed a Law of Nature:* One muſt believe that Naturally ſome Knowledge and Apprehenſion of a *Divinity* is (as it were) printed and ſtampt in the Heart of every Man; and certainly the belief Men have of a *Divinity*, is moſt conſiderable in this, That no Man can bring any ſolid Reaſons againſt it; that it is ſpread all the World over; that it hath been received in all Ages; that it hath conſtantly maintained it ſelf amidſt all the Revolutions of Humane Senſuality; that it hath been found in the remoteſt Iſlands, and in thoſe Lands which are ſeparated from us by ſuch a moſt unconceiveable vaſtneſs of Seas; that they have been diſcovered but in later Ages. And it is a wonderful thing, that thoſe Men; which have almoſt, if not altogether, loſt the knowledge of their Original, and of the ſtreights through

through which the Colonies they are descended from; and have almost lost all Humanity in Eating and Devouring one another; yet have kept this belief, *That there is some Superior Spirit over them.* Not that there is not always some Fools, which say, *There is no God*, as it is said in the *Psalms*: But they commonly are Men abandoned to their Pleasures, and devoted to all Wickedness, who endeavour to perswade themselves against their own Light and Conscience, that there is no Judge to punish their Impiety and Ungodliness; or they are Men of a mean Learning, who yet will go under the Notions of Wits, in receding as much as they can from the universal Belief of the World, assaulting (if one may so speak) him who so gloriously appears by his Works, and Shews himself to all Eyes in the World; or lastly, they are poor simple and ignorant Fellows, who are seduced to Atheism by their frequenting with these Impious and Prophane Men. And if any Rude and Savage Nation is guilty of some strange and monstrous Mis-apprehensions of the *Divinity*, that I say is no more to be inferred against the general Consent of all Nations, than Monsters and Prodigies, which are Born against

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the Natural course of Nature, and the ordinary way it follows in the production of its works.

The Third Reason.

The Third Reason, Is drawn from the terrors of Conscience, because of Sin, for those Fears and Terrors which Men feel after the Commission of some Wickedness, shew evidently that there is a God that terrifies them by the inward threats of his Vengeance: and it is to no purpose to say that the fears of the Penalties of the Laws breeds these Terrors within them; seeing that Supream Magistrates, to wit, Princes and Kings, who are not subject to these Laws, are troubled with these Terrors as well as others: witness, Emperor *Caligula*, the most furious and raging of all Men, against God; who yet when it thundred, as if the Living God had spoken from Heaven, would hide himself under his Bed, as if he would have made with it a shield against the Thunder-bolts. And though in some Men, the Pleasures and Sensualities wherein they drown themselves, do for a time blunt the sense of these Terrors; yet it is to be believed certainly, that in that case it is with them as with

those Prisoners, Which will be Drunk and Merry for all their Shackles and Fetters; but when once the fumes are puffed out, and they begin to reflect upon their Crimes and their Judge; the very Idea and Representation of a Gibbet, will make them shake and tremble: so I say it is with these Impious Men; for being forced to leave their Pleasures and Sensualities, and particularly when Death draws near unto them, they reflect upon the Justice of God, and tremble at the Idea and Horrours of Hell, which is prepared for them.

The Fourth Reason.

The Fourth Reason, Is drawn from the existence of Devils, who being Mens Mortal Enemies and mightier than they, would have already destroyed them were there not a God, who holds their Bridle so fast, that they can do nothing without his permission. Now that there are Devils, appears by the woful confession and condition of so many Witches and Magicians Condemned to Death, for having given themselves to the Devil, and committed a world of Wickedness by his Instigation; as also by so many Men, who by the just Permission

miſſion of God, and that for their Sins, have been poſſeſt with the Devil. And by ſo many true Hiſtories, received by the moſt excellent Wits; which tell us that very prodigious things have been acted by Devils, which exceeded the ſtrength of all other Creatures: See *d' Aſſigni* in the Preface *Porphir.* &c.

The Fifth Reaſon.

The Fifth Reaſon, Is drawn from the firſt Mover, and grounded upon this Principle, That whatſoever Moves, is moved by another, and that other is moved again by another, and ſo conſequently till one ſtays at laſt to a firſt immoveable Mover of all Things, which is God; elſe one would proceed to the infinite, and conſequently there would be an infiniteneſs of Movers, which is impoſſible.

The ſame may be ſaid of the Firſt Cauſe, and may be grounded upon this Principle, That whatſoever is produced, is produced by a Cauſe, and this Cauſe is again produced by another, and ſo conſequently till one comes to a firſt Cauſe of all Things, which is God; elſe one would proceed to the infinite, and there would be an infiniteneſs of Cauſes, which is impoſſible. L 2 Ano-

Another Reaſon may be drawn from the independency of the firſt Being, thus: Either all Things that have a Being, have their Being of another, or there is ſome one which hath not its Being of another, but of it ſelf: Now all Things have not their Being of another; elſe it would follow, that that other Thing ſhould have its Being of it ſelf; ſeeing it is comprized under this Word, *All Things*; Therefore there is ſomething which hath not its Being of another but of it ſelf; and that Thing cannot be no other but God.

Thus again, I may reaſon from the neceſſity of the firſt Being, Either all Things are contingent, or there is one neceſſary: Now all Things are not contingent; elſe they might not have been; and ſuppoſe they had not been, it would have been impoſſible that they ſhould have been afterwards; ſeeing that nothing produces it ſelf, and that there would never have been any Agent, that might have produced them, every Agent being comprized and included, under this word, *All Things*: therefore there hath been a neceſſary Thing which hath produced all contingent Things; and that Thing can't be no other but God.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, I may make uſe here of another Reaſon, drawn from the excellency of the firſt Being; in this manner: The Things which are more or leſs, ſuch, or like, are related to one that is chiefly and principally ſuch: For Example, Things more or leſs hot, are related to that which is moſt hot, *viz.* to the Fire; Things more or leſs white, are related to that which is moſt white, *viz.* to Snow, or any other whiter Thing, if there is any; and Things more or leſs Bright are related to that which is moſt Bright and Shining, *viz.* to the Sun: There are Things more or leſs perfect and excellent, therefore they are related to a thing moſt perfect and moſt excellent, *viz.* to *GOD*; ſeeing that by the word *GOD*, we conceive, mean, and underſtand the moſt excellent, and the moſt perfect of all Things.

The Sixth Reaſon.

The Sixth Reaſon may be deduced from the Novelty of Hiſtories, for it is moſt true that the moſt Ancient profane Hiſtories, reach very little beyond the War of *Troy*, that is about Three thouſand years; ſeeing that ſince the Deſtruction of *Troy*, unto the Foundation

dation of *Rome*, Men reckon but Four hundred thirty two years; and ſince the Foundation of *Rome* to the Nativity of Chriſt, there is but Seven hundred and fifty years: and from Jeſus Chriſt unto this day, we commonly reckon but One thouſand ſix hundred ſeventy eight years; and the Holy Hiſtory written by *Moſes*, the moſt Ancient of all Hiſtories, dos not go beyond Five or ſix thouſand years. Now it is not likely that if Men had been from all Eternity, we ſhould have the Hiſtories but of Five or ſix thouſand years. For as if the World ſhould ſtill continue, Two or three hundred thouſand years, Men would ſurely have all that time the Hiſtories of above Six thouſand years: So if Men had been from all Eternity, and that there were above an Hundred thouſand times, an Hundred millions of years ſince they had had a Being, certainly we ſhould reckon above Six thouſand years; and the Memory of all Men would not only extend it ſelf to ſo few years as it does.

If any object, That ſome Nations have reckoned Twenty thouſand years, and others Fifty thouſand, or more; I ſay that thoſe Books which relate theſe Things are fabulous, and their Authors had no ground for what they writ; or one may ſay, That thoſe Nations which have reckoned Twenty thouſand years,

did

did reckon their years by the ſeaſons of each year; and thoſe that have reckoned Fifty, did reckon the years according to the courſe of the Moon, and did reckon moneths for years. Therefore one muſt ſay, That Men have had a Beginning, and that not having had it of themſelves, ſeeing that nothing produces it ſelf, they have had it of another, to wit, of God, the moſt wiſe Creator of the Univerſe, as I have proved ſufficiently. Add to this reaſon that the invention or finding out of Arts and Sciences, is ſince five or ſix thouſand years, which doth evidently ſhew a Beginning, being not likely that Men would have remained an infiniteneſs of time, before the finding out of the ſame.

The Seventh Reaſon.

The Seventh Reaſon is drawn from the Conſideration, That the Sea hath not ſubmerged the Earth: I reaſon thus, If the Earth and the Sea had been from all Eternity, it would follow that the Channels of the Sea ſhould have been filled long ago; and conſequently that the Sea would have covered the face of the whole Earth, which yet is not come to paſs. To verifie and make that good, one muſt ſuppoſe a thing, which I hold to be moſt true, and which cannot be denied, to wit, that Rain and Floods troubling and thickening in Rivers, by the Earth they carry away with them; and theſe Rivers carrying again theſe troubled Waters into the Sea, do bring in it more Earth than comes out of it. From whence I frame this Argument: If by reaſon of Rain or Floods, a little

tle quantity of Earth enters into the Sea; without coming out of it again, it follows that within an infinite time, ſuch as Eternity is, the Channels of the Sea ſhould be filled: for if but one Corn of Sand or Earth ſhould enter into the Sea every year, Eternity comprehending an infiniteneſs of years, it is evident that an infiniteneſs of Earth ſhould have entered into the Sea, and would have filled not onely the Channels of the Sea, but an hundred millions of others, if there were ſo many; and ſo the Sea would have covered the face of the Earth. But by reaſon of Rain and Floods, a little quantity of Earth enters into the Rivers, and from thence into the Sea, without ever coming out of it again. Therefore within an infinite time, ſuch as Eternity is, the Channels of the Sea would be filled; and conſequently if the Earth and the Sea had been from all Eternity, the Channels of the Sea being filled, the Sea would have covered the whole Earth. By this Reaſon, *Polybius* in the Fourth Book of his Hiſtory, proves that the *Euxine* Sea, and other places, ſhall be filled at laſt: And *Herodotus* in the Second Book, uſes the ſame Reaſon, to prove, that ſometimes *Egypt* was a Sea. Seeing then that the Sea hath not covered the Earth, Let us conclude that neither Sea nor Earth have been from all Eternity, but have had a Beginning; and having not had it of themſelves, ſeeing that nothing is the cauſe of it ſelf, they muſt neceſſarily have had it of another, and that is the great and glorious God, whom we adore; to him be Praiſe, Honour, and Glory, from Everlaſting to Everlaſting. *Amen.*

FINIS.